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ARTICLES
CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE:
BOUNDARIES AND LEAKAGE
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH*AND MARK

A. COHENt

ABSTRACT

This article provides a critical missing piece to the global
climate change governance puzzle: how to create incentives for the
major developing countries to reduce carbon emissions. The major
developing countries are projected to account for 80 percent of the
global emissions growth over the next several decades, and
substantial reductions in the risk of catastrophic climate change
will not be possible without a change in this emissions path. Yet
the global climate governance measures proposed to date have not
succeeded and may be locking in disincentives as carbon-intensive
production shifts from developed to developing countries. A
multi-pronged governance approach will be necessary. We
identify a new strategy that will be an important component of any
successful effort. Our strategy recognizes that in the context of
climate change, the simplified Coasian approach to pollution
should be updated to include a more complete view of the options
firms face in response to emissions reduction pressure and the
sources of that pressure. We demonstrate how governments and
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non-governmental organizations can use expanded corporate
carbon reporting boundaries and product carbon disclosure to
harness social norms in developed countries. This informal social
license pressure, in turn, will create incentives for firms to seek
emissions reductions from their domestic and global supply chains.
The private market pressure conveyed through supply chains will
reduce leakage from developed countries, create new incentives
for developing country firms and national governments, and play a
surprisingly important role in the formation and implementation of
a successful post-Kyoto global policy architecture.
INTRODUCTION

At the heart of the global climate governance problem lies a
puzzle: how can the risk of catastrophic climate change be reduced
if the major developing countries must make substantial emissions
reductions, but these countries lack the incentive to reduce
emissions, and other nations lack the ability to force them to do
so? Atmospheric carbon targets will not be achieved without the
active participation of the major developing countries.' In all
likelihood, this participation ultimately will take the form of a
post-Kyoto multilateral agreement, but it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for a post-Kyoto agreement alone to create sufficient
incentives for substantial reductions from the major developing
countries. 2 Scholars have proposed creating incentives through
extended compliance deadlines and additional allowance
allocations in a global cap-and-trade agreement, 3 but these
measures have failed thus far, and providing further extensions and
allocations may make it impossible to achieve atmospheric
targets.4 The other leading options-including technology or other
' See infra Part I.A. We include Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico
in the term "major developing countries." See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, CO 2
EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: 1971-2003 at 114-116 (2005). We include
in the term "carbon" all six of the leading anthropogenic greenhouse gases,
including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and the fluorinated gases.
2 See Michael
P. Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets and MacroTransformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 HARV.

ENVTL. L. REv. 303, 309-31 (2009).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China?
The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas

Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1675, 1696 (2008) (discussing excess allowances and
extended deadlines as incentives).
' China and India have recently rejected national mandatory emissions
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subsidies, border trade adjustments, and moral suasion-also face
substantial barriers.5
After more than a decade of post-Kyoto negotiations, it is
becoming clear that multiple strategies will be necessary to solve
the global climate governance puzzle. No single strategy will be
adequate on its own, and some may fail altogether, but if a
sufficient number of strategies create incentives for emissions
reductions there is reason for optimism. Some strategies will have
direct effects on national incentives and some will create indirect,
hydraulic pressure for joining and complying with a post-Kyoto
agreement. We offer the latter in this article.
We argue that although scholars and policymakers have
focused on international cap-and-trade schemes, a sophisticated
approach with an intellectual lineage extending back to Coase,6
they are functioning as if the simplified Coasian choice of
imposing legal obligations on polluting factories or the neighbors
who live downwind adequately describes the range of available
policy options.7 Yet the characteristics of carbon emissions and
decades of research suggest that two simplifying assumptions in
the Coasian example do not fully characterize the complexity of
the climate change problem. First, carbon emissions have global
effects, blurring the traditional boundaries that define the parties
who have incentives to bargain over pollution entitlements and
creating incentives for emissions "leakage" through offshoring.8
limits and even rejected a global emissions reduction target for 2050.

Peter

Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2009, at Al; Mark Landler, Event Shows U.S.-India Split on Climate, N.Y.

TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A6; see also Vandenbergh et al., supra note 2, at 323-31
(discussing limits of post-Kyoto agreement inducements).
5 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96

GEO. L.J. 1565, 1611-12 (2008) (noting the use of technology subsidies, other
subsidies, and moral suasion); see also infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
6 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global EnvironmentalRegulation: Instrument

Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 679-80, 704-35 (1999) (discussing
Coasian and Pigouvian instruments to address international environmental
problems).
See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1 (1960)

(providing factory example); see also infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
8 See generally Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade
System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 293 (2008)

(discussing cap and trade leakage); Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy,
and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1805 (2008) (noting leakage

concerns arising from movement of industry to China); Jonathan B. Wiener,
Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U.
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Second, although the typical Coasian bargain is over the effects of
legal entitlements,9 informal social influence exerted by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), investors, employees, and
customers generates much of the carbon emissions reduction
pressure for firms in the United States (U.S.) and European Union
(EU).' 0 This social pressure defines the scope of a social license to
operate-an informal entitlement that the parties can bargain
over." By accounting for this complexity, we identify a new
governance strategy in which governments and private actors use
information disclosure to harness social norm-driven market
pressure across national boundaries.
To assess the risk of leakage, we examine the emerging
consensus on the boundary of the entity that should be subject to
carbon reporting and cap-and-trade allowance-holding standards.12
We conclude that the emerging public and private governance
schemes do not present a substantial risk of leakage from shifting
carbon emissions among domestic facilities in the U.S., but they
do present a substantial risk of cross-border leakage. We find that
L. REV. 1961 (2007) (noting the need for broader global coverage in
climate change regimes to reduce leakage).
9 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
PENN.

Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV.

1089, 1090 (1972) (discussing property rules and liability rules and noting that
legal rules may arise from common law or government regulation); see also infra
notes 63-75 and accompanying text.
'0 In some cases the pressure is applied directly; in others it is conveyed and
shaped by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade associations, or hybrid
public-private organizations.

See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public

Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 551-56 (2000) (discussing impact that
actors in private sector have in the public realm); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The
Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2041-66 (2006)

(identifying how interactions among private actors in response to public laws can
enhance or undermine regulatory objectives); BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL.,
GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE

OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 4-5 (2004) (explaining the emergence of non-state

market-driven governance systems and their importance).
" This phenomenon has been studied at length at the local level but it has
important unexplored implications for global climate change. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES at viii,

40-64 (1991) (examining Coase's parable of the farmer and the rancher and
concluding that in Shasta Country the starting point for bargaining is often
informal norms, not legal entitlements); see also Neil Gunningham et al., Social
License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance,

29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 308-10 (2004) (suggesting that firms function as
though they need a "social license" to operate).
12 See infra notes 88-164 and accompanying
text.
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public and private standards have converged on a common carbon
footprint boundary that requires reporting emissions from large
facilities (e.g., reporting by facilities that emit more than 25,000
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2eq) per year)13 but
excludes emissions from suppliers.14 The same narrow facility
boundary appears in public cap-and-trade regimes,' 5 even though
suppliers represent roughly three-quarters of the emissions
associated with products in the U.S.16
Domestic suppliers are not likely to be a major source of
leakage because most emissions from domestic U.S. suppliers that
fall below the 25,000 ton threshold are likely to be captured by the
"upstream" provisions of government reporting and cap-and-trade
systems.17 These upstream provisions will require reporting and
allowance-holding by all major fossil fuel suppliers, thereby
capturing within the regulatory regime a substantial share of the
13 See

American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 [hereinafter
American Clean Energy and Security Act or Waxman-Markey bill], H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. § 713(a) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009)
(adopting reporting threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO 2eq annually); see also
America's Climate Security Act of 2007 [hereinafter America's Climate Security
Act or Leiberman-Warner bill], S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 4(7) (2008) (providing
reporting requirements for "covered facilities," including industrial facilities that
emit more than 10,000 metric tons of CO 2eq annually). CO 2eq includes all six
major greenhouse gases, using CO 2 as a common measure of global warming
potential. We discuss the Lieberman-Warner bill in this article, but we note that
the most recent Senate legislation includes other provisions that differ in some
details on the central issues discussed in this article. See, e.g., Clean Jobs and
American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong. § 700(13) (2009) (adopting a
threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO 2eq). For a discussion of how the
empirical basis for the 25,000 metric ton boundary was determined, see infra
note 18 and accompanying text.
14 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
274 (commissioning EPA to study the feasibility of a "national program for
measuring, reporting, publicly disclosing, and labeling products or materials sold
in the United States for their carbon content . . .").
" See infra notes 146-160 and accompanying text.
16 H. Scott Matthews et al., The Importance of Carbon FootprintEstimation

Boundaries, 42 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5839, 5840 (2008) (indicating that
boundaries most commonly employed in calculating carbon emissions in
reporting schemes leave up to 74 percent of carbon emissions out).
17 See infra notes 90-166 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of
upstream and downstream cap-and-trade programs, see STAFF OF H. COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION DESIGN WHITE PAPER:
SCOPE OF A CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 9 & n.7 (2007), available at

http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/ClimateChange/WhitePaper. 10030
7.pdf.
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emissions from domestic suppliers.' 8 Emissions from offshore
suppliers, however, will not be accounted for unless the supplier is
located in a country with an adequate cap-and-trade scheme or is
subject to emissions allowance requirements for imported goods.'19
Thus, in the case of global climate change, firms can create
leakage through offshoring production to firm facilities abroad or
third-party supply-chain contractors. Shifting carbon-intensive
production to developing countries will not only cause leakage, it
will reinforce developing country incentives to resist carbon
reduction targets.
We argue that social license pressure facilitated by public and
private carbon disclosure standards can affect whether a firm's
offshore suppliers are more than just a source of leakage. If the
prescriptive norms of customers and others add a carbon constraint
to a firm's social license to operate, and if the constraint applies to
emissions from suppliers without regard to the legal corporate
boundary or the location of the manufacturing facility, then
emissions reduction incentives can extend to offshore suppliers.20
A firm can respond to these pressures by imposing new conditions
on suppliers through the terms of its supply chain contracts or by
only contracting with parties that meet certain conditions. The
firm then functions as the private regulator of its supply chain,
imposing requirements on suppliers that are typically the concern
of governments, not private firms.21
Wal-Mart serves as a leading example. In the face of strong
social license and other pressures in the U.S., it has imposed
energy efficiency and other requirements on its eighteen billion
'8 See,

e.g.,

EPA,

PROPOSED

MANDATORY

GHG

REPORTING

RULE:

OVERVIEW 12 (2009) (noting that 54.9 percent of emissions will be covered by
downstream reporting provisions with a 25,000 metric ton threshold, and another
30-35 percent will be covered by the upstream provisions).
19 See infra notes 90-166 and accompanying text.
2o Our analysis raises questions about the effects of social license pressure on
the firm's make-or-buy decision, but these questions are beyond the scope of this
article. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
21 See Graeme Auld et al., The New Corporate Social Responsibility, 33
ANN. REV. ENv'T & RES. 413, 424 (2008) (noting that non-state, market-driven
systems create incentives for private firms to create global public goods); David
Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 264
(2008) (referring to "civil regulations"); John Gerard Ruggie, Reconstituting the
Global Public Domain - Issues, Actors, and Practices, 12 EUR. J. INT'L

RELATIONS 499, 500 (2004) (noting the new "institutionalized arena concerned
with the production of global public goods").
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dollars per year, 10,000 member supply chain in China.22
According to one recent report, roughly 20 percent of all Chinese
factories are in the supply chain for Wal-Mart's suppliers.2 3
Through its huge grocery subsidiary in Brazil, Wal-Mart also
recently imposed deforestation restrictions on its beef suppliers.24
In addition, in response to a Greenpeace report on deforestation
practices by the cattle industry, Wal-Mart, McDonald's, and
companies in the shoe business including Nike, Timberland, and
Adidas recently exerted supply chain pressure on suppliers of beef
and leather, inducing the major cattle ranching operations in Brazil
to commit not to purchase cattle from recently deforested areas of
the Amazon.25 Although questions exist about the enforcement of
these commitments, they have the potential to reduce Chinese and
Brazilian carbon emissions as much as or more than many public
governance measures available to the U.S. or EU.
The choices available to policymakers in the absence of a
global Leviathan thus are not simply various forms of beneficiary
pays instruments.26 If we switch the perspective from the
interactions among national governments to the ways public and
private actors can harness social norms and private bargaining,
new options become apparent. To harness the social licensedriven, supply chain contracting opportunities, we argue that the
reporting provisions of public and private governance schemes
should include supply chains within corporate carbon footprint
reporting boundaries. We also argue that these schemes should
include product carbon labeling requirements. 27 These disclosure
measures will facilitate the development of a clear and broad
carbon constraint in the social license to operate, and provide the
22

See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S.

CAL. L. REV. 905, 940 (2008).
2
See Daniel Goleman, Green Intelligence: Toward True Ecological
Transparency, YALE ENV'T 360, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.e360.yale.edu/
content/print.msp?id=2190.
24 See Michael Kepp,
Wal-Mart Brasil Signs Sustainability Pact with
Suppliers to Ensure 'Greener' Products, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, July 6, 2009,
at 1.
25 See Alexei Barrionuevo, Giants in Cattle Industry Agree to Help Fight

Deforestation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A7 (noting that deforestation
accounts for 20 percent of global GHG emissions).
26 See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 6, at 752-53 (arguing that beneficiary pays
instruments may be a viable option when polluter pays instruments are
unavailable because of the absence of a global regulatory body).
27 See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying
text.
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information necessary to facilitate private monitoring and
enforcement. The resulting social pressure can generate new firm
incentives to reduce supply chain emissions, which in turn can
change the incentives of firms in developing countries. These
firms will then have incentives to influence the policies,
investments, and negotiating positions of their national
governments. Over time, these market pressures will reduce
leakage and increase developing country incentives to join in and
comply with a global climate agreement. Market pressures alone
cannot be expected to shift national incentives, but they can have
an important influence. If the views of many climate scientists and
energy experts are on target, it is time to try many different policy
instruments, knowing that a collection of successful instruments
will be necessary to reduce the risk of catastrophic climate

change. 28
In addition, carbon disclosure strategies can be adopted more
easily than many other options. They address concerns about
major developing country emissions in a way that is far less
intrusive than many other options and thus is likely to provoke less
political resistance. 29 They can be appealing across the political
spectrum because they address the need for developed and
developing countries to reduce emissions. By relying on consumer
preferences and private market pressure, disclosure strategies also
may be less likely to trigger sovereignty objections in developing
countries than national regulatory and nation-to-nation diplomatic
efforts. The pressure for emissions reductions will arise from
numerous acts by private parties in response to public and private
disclosure requirements, not by demands for emissions reductions
from national governments.
28 See, e.g., Nathan S. Lewis, Professor, Cal. Inst. of Tech., Address on
Chemical Challenges in Renewable Energy, transcript available at
http://nsl.caltech.edu/files/energy-notes.pdf (discussing the need for multiple
approaches to generation of low-carbon energy).
In fact, supply chain and product-based carbon disclosure schemes are
already beginning to take hold in the private sector, often with explicit
government cooperation and encouragement. See infra notes 195-210 and
accompanying text. In addition, the Waxman-Markey bill includes a provision to
require EPA to study product carbon labeling. See American Clean Energy and
Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 274 (proposing a new "Product Carbon
Disclosure Program"). If applied equally to domestic and foreign firms and
goods, information disclosure requirements may be more likely to survive trade
challenges than alternatives such as border adjustments. See infra notes 54-57
and accompanying text.
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Using information disclosure to drive supply-chain
contracting pressure may also re-frame one of the most difficult
barriers between the developing and developed countries:
developing countries assert that they are entitled to emit as much
carbon on their path to economic development as the developed
countries have over theirs. 30 Although it is hard to argue that
developing countries should not be able to act as developed
countries have, the developing countries' projected emissions path
alone will lead to a substantial risk of catastrophic climate change.
The disclosure approach reframes the entitlement question from
whether developing countries are entitled to emit as developed
countries have to whether they are entitled to economic growth
through the production of goods that developed world consumers
may not want to buy when they have adequate carbon
information. '
By focusing on the normative aspects of
consumption, this approach also may induce consumers in
developed countries to form and act upon carbon constraints in
their implicit entitlement to consume-an outcome consistent with
the Coasian notion of placing entitlements on polluters or
neighbors.
Consumers might assume some of the carbon
emissions mitigation burden in the form of higher prices, reduced
selection, different product attributes, or different household
behaviors. 32
30 See, e.g., Michael Wines, China Sees Progress on
Climate Accord, but
Resists an Emissions Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A10 (noting that

China's envoy to the global climate negotiations opposed absolute emissions
limits and stated that "[t]he cumulative emissions by the developed countries
have caused global warming. Who should take the historical responsibilities?").
' Rather than simply shifting burdens from developed to developing
countries, the measures we propose are a means to turn the climate change
governance focus from industrial emissions to consumption. See, e.g., Hope M.
Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment:
Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117,

118, 142-52 (2009) (discussing alternate means of changing people's norms in
order to reduce their environmental impact); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor
Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer

Choice, 118 HARv. L. REv. 525, 529 (2004) (arguing that consumers' process
preferences can have a significant role to play in policy decisions). For an article
accounting for consumption in allocating emissions reductions, see Shoibal
Chakravarty et al., Sharing Global C02 Emissions Reductions Among One
Billion High Emitters, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 11,884, 11,885 (July 21,

2009).
32 See, e.g., Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a
Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT.
ACAD. SCI. 18,452, 18,452 (Nov. 3, 2009) (drawing on empirical studies to
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Part I explores the core components of the global climate
governance puzzle and the need to account for the effects of social
license pressure and supply chain contracting. Part II examines the
emerging public and private governance regimes, exploring how
they have defined the targets of carbon emissions regulations (the
legal boundary) and the magnitude of the emissions that will be
missed by the legal boundary (the physical boundary). Part III
examines the effects of these narrow boundaries on national
incentives and leakage. Part IV proposes two carbon reporting
measures and examines how these measures may affect social
license pressure, firm supply chains, and the incentives of the
major developing countries. We conclude that a broader carbon
reporting boundary is a viable approach that can help resolve the
climate change governance puzzle.
I. INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL AND FIRM BEHAVIOR
A.

The Global Climate Change Governance Puzzle

Although our focus is on creating incentives for developing
countries to reduce emissions, we begin this section with a brief
review of our assumptions that substantial carbon emissions
reductions are required from the major developing countries, that
these countries lack the incentive to reduce emissions, and that
other nations lack the ability to force them to do so using existing
policy instruments.
First, substantial emissions reductions are necessary from
major developing countries. Recent emissions from China and
other major developing countries are helping drive annual global
carbon emissions to levels that exceed even the high-end scenario
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 33
demonstrate that over 7 percent of U.S. carbon emissions can be reduced through
prompt, non-regulatory behavioral and social measures). We focus on the major
developing countries, but we do so only to bring clarity to one critical part of the
climate problem, not to suggest that large reductions from developed countries
are not needed. In fact, large reductions from developed countries are needed to
account for past and present emissions. See Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow,
Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with

Current Technologies, 305 Sci. 968, 968-69 (Aug. 13, 2004). The private
market pressures we seek to encourage in developing countries will have similar
effects on developed countries, creating incentives to adopt carbon targets and to
comply with the targets after the commitments are made.
3

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE WORKING GROUP II,
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Global business-as-usual (BAU) emissions (the projected
emissions in the absence of carbon reduction measures) are
projected to double over the next fifty years. 34 Eighty percent of
the growth in global emissions is projected to occur from the major
developing countries.3 5 Yet total global emissions must decline by
50 percent or more from 1990 levels during that period to achieve
atmospheric carbon concentrations of roughly 450 to 500 parts per
million (ppm) C0 2eq,36 which should result in temperature .
stabilization of roughly 2 degrees Celsius.37
Atmospheric
concentrations are roughly 430 ppm CO 2 eq now and are going up
by roughly two ppm per year.38
Even with an emissions decline of 50 percent and atmospheric
concentrations in the 450 to 500 ppm CO 2 eq range, there is a small
but significant likelihood-perhaps in the low single-digits--of
temperature increases far higher than 2 degrees Celsius. 39
Although this may appear to be a low likelihood in the abstract, it
represents a magnitude of risk to the planet that few of us would be
willing to accept when driving a car or boarding a plane. Table 1
identifies the uncomfortably high likelihood of substantial
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 79-131
(2007); JANE A. LEGGETT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA'S GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS AND MITIGATION POLICIES 5-8 (2008), available at

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34659.pdf.
34 See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 32, at 968-69.
3s See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 915 (citing FLORIAN

BRESSAND ET AL.,
McKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND GROWTH:
THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY 24 (2007)). See generally, Nicholas

Stem, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. EcON. REv. 1, 22, 28-9, 32

(2008) (discussing global carbon emissions).
3 Many actors have converged on a target stabilization temperature of 2
degrees Celsius, which corresponds to an atmospheric concentration in the range
of roughly 450 to 500 ppm CO 2eq. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 2, at 317
n.66.
3 Stem, supra note 35, at 5 tbl.1; see also G8 + 5 ACADEMIES' JOINT
STATEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES FOR A Low CARBON FUTURE 2 (2009), available at

http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/G8+5energy-climateO9.pdf
(calling
for a 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by
2050).
38 Robert Ball, Climate Change and Sustainable Futures,22 SYSTEMIC PRAC.
& ACTION RES. 139, 139 (2009) (noting that atmospheric concentrations are at
430 C02-eq and are rising by 2.3 ppm each year).
39 See Stem, supra note 35, at 5 tbl. I (estimating a low single-digit percent
probability of a 4-5 degree increase at 450 ppm and of a 5-6 degree increase at
500 ppm).
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temperature increases even at 450 or 500 ppm CO 2eq.
TABLE 1: PERCENT LIKELIHOOD OF EXCEEDING A TEMPERATURE
INCREASE AT EQUILIBRIUM 4 0
Stablization Level

2*

30

40

50

60

7'

78
96
99
100
100

18
44
69
94
99

3
11
24
58
82

1
3
7
24
47

0
1
2
9
22

0
0
1
4
9

(ppm of CO 2 e)

450
500
550 (doubling)
650
750

As a point of reference, paleoclimate studies suggest that
temperatures have not been 3 degrees Celsius higher than 1900
levels for millions of years (they are 0.8 degrees Celsius higher
today), and at that time sea levels were twenty to thirty meters
higher, and there were crocodiles in Greenland. 4 1
Current per-capita CO 2 eq emissions are roughly twenty tons
per year in the U.S., ten tons per year in Europe and Japan, five
tons in China, and two tons in India.4 2 To achieve a target
40 Id.; see also John P. Holdren, Professor of Environmental
Policy and
Professor of Earth and Planetary Sciences, Harvard University, John H. Chafee
Memorial Lecture on Science and the Environment at National Conference on
Science, Policy and the Environment (Jan. 17, 2008), transcript available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/Conference/Chafee08final.pdf (noting that "[t]he
chance of crossing a tipping point into truly catastrophic climatic change appears
to grow rapidly. .. for increases in the average surface temperature of more than
about 2 degrees C above the 1900 level").
41 See HOLDREN, supra note 40 (noting that temperatures were 3 degrees
Celsius higher thirty million years ago). The mid-Pliocene (roughly three
million years ago) also may have had temperatures roughly 3 degrees Celsius
higher than 1900 levels, with atmospheric concentrations at roughly 360 to 400
ppm CO 2 (not CO 2eq), and sea levels roughly twenty-five meters higher than

today. See Jane E. Francis & Robert S. Hill, Fossil Plantsfrom the Pliocene
Sirius Group, Transantarctic Mountains: Evidence for Climate from Growth

Rings and FossilLeaves, 11 PALAIOS 389, 389 (1996); Alan Haywood & Mark
Williams, The Climate of the Future: Clues From Three Million Years Ago, 21
GEOLOGY TODAY 138, 139 (2005); Alan M. Haywood & Paul J. Valdes,
Modelling Pliocene Warmth: Contribution of Atmosphere, Oceans and
Cryosphere, 218 EARTH & PLANETARY ScI. LETTERS 363, 375 (2004); see also
Alan M. Haywood et al., Pliocene Climate, Processes, and Problems, 367 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y A 3, 5 (2009).
42 See World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT),
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly&mode=View (last visited March 27,
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atmospheric carbon concentration of 500 ppm CO 2eq, the
developed and developing worlds cannot simply converge on a
per-capita carbon emissions figure somewhere between the
existing levels of the U.S. and China. Instead, global per capita
emissions in 2050 must be roughly equal to India's per capita
emissions, which are less than half of recent Chinese emissions
and one-tenth of U.S. per capita emissions.4 3 This must occur
despite the fact that per capita and total emissions in the major
developing countries are going up, not down.4 In fact, China's
current and projected BAU emissions are so large that even if all
other countries eliminate emissions entirely, China may push
atmospheric levels past consensus target levels.45
Second, the major developing countries lack incentives to
commit to and comply with an agreement that requires substantial
emissions reductions as compared to BAU levels. A full
understanding of developing country incentives is beyond the
scope of this article, but recent reviews have suggested that
although climate change will cause major harms in the long-term,
near-term poverty alleviation and economic growth considerations
are likely to dominate.4 6 In addition, the perceived incentives of
the major developing countries may be more important than actual
incentives. Recent resistance to hard targets in a post-Kyoto
agreement and rapidly increasing emissions growth suggest that
2010) (providing data for 2005 per capita CO 2 eq emissions).
43 See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1687-88; Stem, supra note 35, at 5;
Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 916. In addition, emissions reductions should
begin in the next decade if the maximum global concentration is to be held below
roughly 550 ppm CO 2 . Naomi E. Vaughan et al., Climate Change Mitigation:
Trade-Offs Between Delay and Strength of Action Required, 96 CLIMATIC

29, 29 (2009) (noting that "if it takes 50 years to transform the energy
sector and the maximum rate at which emissions can be reduced is -2.5% year,
delaying action until 2020 would lead to stabilization at 540 ppm. A further 20
year delay would result in a stabilization level of 730 ppm.").
4
Recent post-Kyoto negotiations with China have focused on slowing rates
CHANGE

of growth, not net reductions. See generally Leora Falk, Climate Change: United
States, China Sign Memorandum Pledging Cooperation on Climate, Energy,

BNA
45

July 29, 2009.
Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 908.

INT'L ENV'T DAILY,

46 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr. See

generally Cass R. Sunstein, OfMontrealand Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 3 1

HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (2007) (discussing the role that cost-benefit
analysis plays when countries are determining their involvement in international
accords).
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the major developing countries perceive the benefits of carbonintensive economic growth to outweigh the costs of emissions
reductions. For example, China has strong incentives to achieve
economic growth through carbon-intensive manufacturing, and
although it has taken a number of steps to reduce the carbon
intensity of its economy, it has unambiguously stated that
economic considerations are more important than emissions
reductions.4 / Its emissions path is consistent with its public
statements: its aggregate national emissions increased 8 percent in
2007 alone.48
Third, even if the developed nations are able to make
substantial reductions in their own emissions, they lack the ability
to force the developing nations to adopt and comply with adequate
carbon emissions targets. Thus far no combination of lenient
emissions allocations and extended deadlines has been sufficient to
induce the major developing nations to sign onto a post-Kyoto
agreement. 49 Scholars have suggested three principal extra4 See generally Dean Scott, Climate Change: China's Priority Remains
Economic Growth, Not CurbingEmissions, Ambassador Says, BNA INT'L ENV'T

DAILY,

Feb. 6, 2009. For a discussion of carbon intensity reduction efforts, see,

for example, Tony Blair, China Leads the Pack in the Race to Go Green -

Report, GLOBE-NET, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/
DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&Objectld=MzUlMjE (last visited Mar. 29,
2010) (noting that China is taking advantage of the green technology revolution).
48 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Booming China Leads the World in Emissions of
Carbon Dioxide, a Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at A5. For

discussions of China's incentives, see Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1675; David G.
Victor, Climate Accession Deals: New Strategies for Taming Growth of
Greenhouse Gases in Developing Countries 13 (Harvard Project on International

Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-18, 2008), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18735/climate-accession-deals.
html; Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China,

55 UCLA L. REv. 1805 (2008) [hereinafter Wiener, Climate Change Policy];
Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in

Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 210, 239 (2008) [hereinafter Wiener,
Radiative Forcing]. China passed the United States as the leader in annual
emissions by 2008, but the US is still the largest source of existing atmospheric
carbon stocks. At current emissions growth rates, China will pass the United
States in atmospheric stocks within several decades. See Sunstein, supra note 3,
at 1689.
49 See Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Designing the Post-Kyoto
Climate Regime: Lessons from the Harvard Project on International Climate

Agreements 12 (Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements,
Unpublished
Interim
Report,
2008),
available
at
http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Interim%2OReport%20081203%2OAkiko%20
v6.pdf (proposing delayed compliance deadlines and caps that enable emissions
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agreement approaches to increase pressure on China and other
developing nations: subsidies, international trade sanctions or
border adjustments, and moral suasion.50 These measures are
likely to be necessary but not sufficient. Climate-related subsidies
in the form of technology transfers or adaptation funds have been
widely discussed, but they have been a drop in the bucket so far,
and the prospects seem dim that they will be provided on the
massive scale necessary to tip the balance of incentives for these
countries.5 ' For example, China has suggested that richer nations
should contribute 1 percent of their gross domestic product to
assist developing nations, an amount far larger than the amounts
offered by developed countries and one that would come on top of
the amounts the richer nations will be spending to reduce their own
emissions. 52 Subsidies for high-priority issues not directly linked
to climate change, whether disease prevention, infrastructure, or
other project funding, could be an important inducement, but given
the history of foreign aid there is little reason to believe that they
will be provided at the scale necessary to shift developing country
incentives regarding carbon emissions reductions.53
Measures that impose trade sanctions or carbon allowance
growth).
so See generally SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE
STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (Oxford Univ. Press 2005)
[hereinafter BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT]; RICHARD B. STEWART
& JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY BEYOND KYOTO

(2003); Victor, supra note 48, at 13-15 (proposing the use of climate accession
deals to build on the internal incentives and development plans of China and
other developing countries). Developing country participation may take the form
of multiple bilateral or multilateral agreements rather than a single agreement.
See Scott Barrett, A Portfolio System of Climate Treaties 2-3 (Harvard Project on

International Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 08-13, 2008), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/BarrettWeb4.pdf [hereinafter Barrett,
Portfolio System].
51 See Victor, supra note 48, at 12 (noting that "[t]he size and political
visibility of external assistance is a severe constraint because most governments
that would provide resources are not able to mobilize large amounts of on-budget
expenditure that is transferred to their most fierce economic competitors").
52

See Tini Tran, China: Richer States Should Lead on Climate Change,
PREsS,
Oct.
29,
2008,
available
at
http://

ASSOCIATED

www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-10-28-2523529892_x.htm. In contrast, a
recent proposal by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown suggested $100 billion
from rich nations "to help poor nations with the changing climate." Roger
Harrabin, Climate. Deal in Peril, Says Brown, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 21,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluknews/8265974.stm.
s3 See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5.
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requirements on imports from countries that have inadequate
emissions limits may have the best prospects for shifting
developing country incentives. 54 Border allowance provisions,
which require foreign manufacturers to purchase emissions permits
for products that enter the domestic market from countries without
adequate carbon emissions limits, have been proposed as part of
cap-and-trade programs in the U.S. and in Europe.5 5 At this point,
however, the adoption and implementation of these measures in
the near term, at least in the U.S., seems unlikely given concerns
about triggering a trade war and the delays involved in resolving
the inevitable trade disputes. 56 Even President Obama, who has
expressed support for strong climate measures, objected to the
border allowance provisions in an otherwise favorable comment on
recent cap-and-trade legislation."
Moral suasion also may have substantial influence, and
movement by the U.S. and EU may increase the pressure on the
major developing countries. 8 If the recent statements from China
and India are any indication, however, appeals to morality are
unlikely to induce commitments to reductions from BAU
emissions levels. 59 In addition, the major developing countries
54 See Barrett, Portfolio System, supra note 50, at 5-6 (discussing prospects
for trade restrictions).
5 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
768 (2009); Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 6006 (2008) The
specific provisions vary, but in general they reduce incentives for leakage and
seek to level the playing field for domestic industries by requiring the importer of
a good to obtain carbon allowances before importing from a country that lacks an
adequate emissions program.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 933-34; Wiener, Radiative Forcing,
supra note 48, at 242-43.

See John M. Broder, Obama Opposes Trade Sanctions in Climate Bill,

N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2009, at Al.
ss See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1696. For a recent analysis combining capand-trade and moral suasion measures, see Ian Ayers & Douglas Kysar, Adam

Smith Meets Climate Change: How the Theory of Moral Sentiments Could Be
Applied to Cap-and-Trade Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, SLATE, Sept. 27, 2008,

http://www.slate.com/id/220091 1/index.html.
s9 See BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT, supra note 50, at 16-18;
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1592 & n.123; Wiener, Climate Change
Policy, supra note 48, at 1810-11. Only in April 2009 did a senior member of
China's climate change negotiating team allude that the government is
considering emission targets for 2011. See Jonathan Watts, China Considers
Setting Targets on Carbon Emissions, GUARDIAN, Apr. 20, 2009, at 14, available

at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/1 9/china-environment-kyoto.
More recent positions have reflected continued opposition to hard targets. See
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have argued that the moral burden lies with the developed
countries based on their contribution to current atmospheric carbon
stocks as compared to the developing countries' contribution to
recent flows. 60
B.

Of Coase and Private Governance

Our approach to resolving the global climate governance
puzzle reflects the dynamic interactions between public and private
governance regimes and the responses of private parties to those
regimes. For a generation, law and economics scholars have noted
that regulated entities bargain around the law. Law students often
learn the lesson from what Coase describes as "the standard
example," which includes "a factory the smoke from which has
harmful effects on those occupying neighboring properties." 6'
Subsequent texts have drawn from this example to explore the
allocation of entitlements to cause or to be free from pollution, 62
and a vast literature has explored the implications of this idea for
property and liability rules. 63
Coase's work also has been the inspiration for the
development of the cap-and-trade schemes that are now the
principal carbon regulatory instruments at the domestic and
international levels.6 A cap-and-trade scheme creates clearly
Baker, supra note 4, at Al.
60 See Baker, supra note 4, at Al; Landler, supra note 4, at Al; see also
Joshua Chaffin & Jamil Anderlini, Barroso Presses China on Green Issues, FIN.
TIMES, May 21, 2009, at 7; Thomas L. Friedman, Can I Clean Your Clock?, N.Y.

TIMES, July 5, 2009, at A12 (noting comments regarding China's right to emit as
much as developed countries did in the past).
61 See Coase, supra note 7, at 1-2.
62 See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION

TO LAW AND

ECONOMICS 13-16 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2003) (using factory example);
RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 7-17

(1997) (same).
63 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9; Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis,

109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.

440, 447-64 (1995); Carol M. Rose, The. Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE
L.J. 2175 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1719 (2004); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
UncertaintyAbout PropertyRights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (2008).

6 See Wiener, supra note 6, at 776-77 (noting Coasian origins of cap-andtrade schemes). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (proposing

domestic cap-and-trade scheme).
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defined entitlements to pollute (measured in tons of emissions) and
a low-transaction cost setting in which those entitlements can be
traded. A global cap-and-trade scheme requires that the leading
emitting countries commit to and comply with the emissions caps,
however, and as we have seen, the major developing countries
appear to lack the incentive to do so. Nevertheless, the recognition
that parties bargain in the shadow of the law, if updated to reflect
the complexities of carbon emissions and the modem influences on
firm behavior, can help identify new policy levers. To identify
these instruments, we re-examine the two implicit simplifying
assumptions in the Coasian example identified at the outset.
Responses to Emissions Reduction Pressures

1.

The first simplifying assumption is that the polluting firm's
choice in response to emissions reduction pressures is between
reducing emissions and bargaining with the affected residents over
reductions or compensation. In a typical Coasian bargain, the legal
entitlements are specified so that those who are affected by
pollution may negotiate with the polluter, with one party paying
the other to achieve an efficient outcome.6 5 The implicit
assumption is that the pollution affects only the neighbors who are
engaged in the bargain with the polluter. Social welfare is initially
defined within the boundaries of that narrow set of actors.
Studies have identified a number of ways in which the
polluting firm's choice is not limited to reducing emissions or
bargaining with the neighbors affected by its pollution, however,
but also can include contracting out or reorganizing production in
response to legal requirements. 66 Presumably, if a polluter wants
to avoid the cost of bargaining by moving to another location, it
will have to bargain with any nearby residents in its newly
proposed location. This approach might be efficient in the context
of traditional pollution with effects that only occur within narrow
geographic boundaries, assuming that adequate incentives exist in
the new location (although it will inevitably raise equity
See Coase, supra note 7, at 2-8.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 2061 (noting example of toxics
reporting under the Massachusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act). See generally
Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfatheringand Environmental
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV.
1677 (2007) (examining effects of public environmental regulations on private
investments in new facilities).
65

66
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concerns-something that is beyond the Coasian model) and
shifting carbon emissions does not reduce their effects. Carbon
emissions have essentially the same climate-forcing impact
whether they are released in Topeka or Beijing. Thus, even if local
residents bargain with a polluter and obtain a commitment to
reduce carbon emissions, the firm can move those emissions to
another jurisdiction through offshore suppliers, and the benefit of
the bargain to the residents in the first location is lost as they still
must suffer the consequences of climate change. 67 This is the
leakage problem that has become a significant obstacle to adopting
carbon emission reduction plans.68 We are not the first to note that
firms externalize harms through offshoring and outsourcing, 69 but
the analysis suggests that incentives created by the current and
proposed climate governance measures have received insufficient
attention.

67 This can occur through offshoring production to other
firm facilities or to
third-party supply chain contractors. We focus on the offshoring in this article,
although much of the analysis is equally applicable to firm-owned facilities. See
infra note 69 and accompanying text.
6 See Stavins, supra note 8, at 311.
6 See, e.g., Smita B. Brunnermeier & Arik Levinson, Examining the

Evidence on Environmental Regulations and Industry Locations, 13 J. ENV'T &

DEV. 6, 36 (2004) (discussing offshoring due to environmental costs); Beverley
Earle et al., A Finger in the Dike? An Examination of the Efficacy of State and
FederalAttempts to Use Law to Stem Outsourcing, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 89,

91-93 (2007) (discussing offshoring to avoid health care costs).
70 In the current regulatory environment, a firm's decision to avoid the costs
of carbon emissions reporting and controls may be more likely to be affected by
the location of production than whether the production occurs within or outside
the legal boundary of the firm, but this analysis raises interesting issues regarding
the make-or-buy decision that are beyond the scope of this article. See generally,
e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is
CorporateLaw?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic

Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J.
POL. EcON. 1119 (1990); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private
Bureaucracies:A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. EcON. &
ORG.

306 (1999); Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Fundamental

Theorem of Design Economics (Harvard NOM, Working Paper No. 02-12,
2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-312419.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 239 2010-2011

240

N.Y.U..ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 18

Sources ofPressurefor Emissions Reductions

2.

The second simplifying assumption in the Coasian example is
that formal legal requirements, whether common law or regulatory
in origin, are the primary source of the emissions reduction
pressure that stimulates bargaining. In a Coasian scenario,
establishment of clear entitlements is key to efficient allocation of
resources because it facilitates bargaining by establishing a clear
starting point for negotiation.7 1 Scholars have demonstrated that
bargaining not only occurs between a polluter and a neighbor or
government actor based on a fixed common law or regulatory
standard, but also occurs between public and private entities over
the shape and enforcement of the legal entitlement.72 For example,
firms and regulatory bodies routinely bargain over the terms in air
and water discharge permits.73
In addition, scholarship in law, economics, and other fields
over the last several decades has explored the importance of
bargaining over the scope of implicit entitlements that are shaped
by informal norms. An extensive literature has demonstrated the
importance of norms in situations ranging from interactions among
ranchers and farmers over stray cattle 7 4 to lobster harvesting and
other common pool resource problems.75 This research has
focused in large part on small group settings, 76 but it has identified
See Coase, supra note 7, at 8 ("It is necessary to know [the allocation of
legal entitlements] since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of
rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them.").
72 Freeman, supra note 10, at 551-56. This bargaining between
the regulator
and the regulated firm generates public-private hybrid requirements and
enforcing entities. Bargaining also occurs in the provision of traditionally public
services by private providers. See Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 155, 164-69 (2000). See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow
71

eds., 2009); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,

116 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (2003).
n Freeman, supra note 10, at 554-59.
74 See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at viii.

See generally, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (examining norms

in common pool resource situations).
76 For examples of scholarship that examined large group situations, see ERIC
A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 112-32 (Harvard University Press 2d ed.
2002) (voting); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 943, 964-65 (1995) (motorcycle helmets); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social
Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 359,

361-63 (2003) (subway riding, driving, and Internet file-sharing); Cass R.
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a number of general characteristics of situations in which norms
are influential.77 We believe three characteristics are likely to be
important for Coasian bargaining over firm carbon emissions:
well-defined entitlements, adequate information, and opportunities
for enforcement through social sanctions or rewards.
A modem account of the influences on firm carbon emissions
should therefore include social license pressures arising from the
prescriptive norms of a firm's stakeholders (e.g., customers,
investors, community opinion leaders, employees, and
managers), 8 and a new strategy designed to leverage social license
pressures should create the conditions necessary for this pressure
to result in carbon emissions reductions. 79 To enhance bargaining,
the new strategy should seek to clearly delineate the existence and
extent of the carbon constraint in the social license to operate. To
ensure that the social license pressure reduces leakage and extends
to developing countries, the strategy should encourage the scope of
the carbon constraint to include supply chain emissions. To ensure
that the parties have adequate information to bargain over the
carbon aspect of the social license, the strategy should ensure that
carbon emissions data are available to firms and their stakeholders
in ways that facilitate private monitoring and enforcement.
Substantial development along these lines has occurred in the
last two decades.80 Social pressures increasingly result in a social
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 909-25
(1996) (roadside tipping and littering); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without
Social Norms: How PersonalNorm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99

Nw. U. L. REv. 1101, 1159-63 (2005) (toxics-releasing household activities).
n The law and economics literature has examined whether norms are welfare
or wealth-enhancing. See ELLICKSON, supra note 11, at 170-72; POSNER, supra

note 76, at 10-15. This is an important issue for norms that affect carbon
emissions, but for the purposes of this article we assume that the need for
prompt, additional carbon emissions reductions is sufficiently great that norms
that induce firms to reduce carbon emissions are welfare-enhancing.
7 See infra notes 218-231 and accompanying text. Of course, firms differ
from individuals in many important ways, but they also respond to social
influences. The classic example involves the Toxics Release Inventory, which
has been shown to induce firms to reduce emissions in the absence of any
regulatory requirements. See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as
Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions,
32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 122-23 (1997) (demonstrating impact of

mandatory disclosure requirements on firm toxic emissions); see also Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in

Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REv. 913, 913 (2007).
79 See, e.g., Gunningham et al., supra note 11, at 308-10.
s0 See infra notes 207-254 and accompanying text.
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license to operate that is more restrictive as to carbon emissions
than the applicable formal legal entitlements. The contours of the
social entitlement are still emerging, but they often ascribe
responsibility to firms based on goods produced and include not
only the selling firm but also the entire supply chain with little
regard for legal or national boundaries. 8' As we discuss in Part II,
however, there is a risk that while public and private standards will
create a clear new social license boundary, it will be one that
excludes supply chain emissions.8 2
In addition, private and public-private entities have emerged
that develop, monitor, and enforce environmental standards in the
absence of government regulation.83 These organizations often
focus on environmental effects that are not subject to formal legal
requirements, 84 but to date there has been far more activity
associated with various forms of environmental sustainability than
with carbon emissions.85 Industry trade associations and joint
industry-NGO organizations have developed private standards for
environmental performance in forestry, fisheries, chemical
production, and other areas. 86 Standards for reporting and
restricting carbon emissions are not as far along, but are
progressing quickly.
81 See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 937-39 (identifying firms that are
imposing extra-legal supply chain requirements on domestic and foreign
suppliers).
2 Recent work demonstrates that in some situations, firms bargain in the
shadow of legal and social license pressures in ways that enhance, rather than
undermine, regulatory objectives. For example, concern about Superfund and
other liability induces private firms in the U.S. to spend more money each year
on private environmental investigations in connection with loans, mergers, and
other transactions than the entire federal Environmental Protection Agency
enforcement budget. Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 2048-49.
" See generally CASHORE ET AL., supra note 10; Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Post-Sovereign Environmental Governance, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 72 (2004);
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006).
84 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 2041-66.
8s A leading example is the standard developed by the International
Standardization Organization (ISO) to induce firms to adopt environmental
management systems and conduct environmental audits (the ISO 14000 series).
See Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Racing to the Bottom? Trade,
Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001, 50 AM. J. POL. Sci. 350, 351-52
(2006) (discussing ISO 14001).
86 See, e.g., Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global PrivatePublic Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EuR. J. INT'L L. 47, 47-48 (2006)
(discussing private forestry standards).
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II. LEGAL AND PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES

What should be included within the boundary of a corporate
carbon footprint? As we demonstrate below, with little debate a
clear choice is emerging in private and public standards that a
narrow boundary is preferable. Although the clarity is admirable,
the narrow boundary is not. The economic incentives of corporate
firms are a function of the physical characteristics of the activity
that generates carbon emissions and the ways in which the legal
standard includes-or excludes-these emissions from regulation.
We begin by examining the legal boundaries that have been
proposed or adopted thus far in private and public carbon
governance regimes. We find that although substantial differences
exist, a common legal boundary has emerged. Private schemes
ostensibly include all emissions from facilities owned or controlled
by a corporate firm, but they exclude emissions from third-party
suppliers. Public schemes exclude emissions not only from third
party suppliers, but also from small facilities within the corporate
firm. We then review the physical boundaries: the characteristics
of the carbon emissions from firms in the most important
economic sectors.
A.
1.

The Legal Boundary

PrivateReportingRegimes

Private climate change governance regimes typically require
participants to report carbon emissions, presumably on the theory
that public disclosure will lead to legal, economic, and social
Numerous private
pressure for emissions reductions.8 7
organizations have developed voluntary carbon reporting
schemes.88 We summarize the carbon footprint boundary used in
several of the programs in Table 1-The Climate Registry (TCR),
the World Resources Institute Carbon Protocol (WRI), the Carbon
Disclosure Project (CDP), and the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI). We also examine two of them in more detail below. In
8 See generally Gunningham et al., supra note 11; Konar & Cohen, supra
note 78, at 123-24 (discussing role of information as supplement to regulation).
" See, e.g., Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited
Mar. 29, 2010); World Resources Institute, GHG Protocol Initiative,
http://www.wri.org/project/ghg-protocol (last visited Mar. 29, 2010); Global
Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
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short, the private reporting regimes to date have converged on the
corporate firm as the entity subject to carbon emissions reporting
and do not include third party suppliers. Carbon emissions
reporting programs, both voluntary and mandatory, include three
"scopes" 89 (sometimes called "tiers" 90). Although minor variations
exist across reporting programs, the basic framework is as follows:
Scope 1: Direct carbon emissions from sources owned or
controlled by a company.91
Scope 2: Indirect carbon emissions associated with the purchase
of heat, cooling, steam, or electricity consumed by the,
company. 92
Scope 3: All other indirect emissions not included in Scope 2,
including emissions from the supply chain. 93
As Table 2 indicates, none of the private voluntary reporting
schemes require reporting of supply-chain emissions, though
several private voluntary programs encourage some such
reporting.9 4 For example, both the leading domestic private
reporting scheme in the United States, TCR, 9 5 and the leading
89 See, e.g., WORLD Bus. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD RES.
INST., THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND

REPORTING STANDARD 25 (2004) [hereinafter WRI/WBCSD Carbon Protocol]
(using the term "scope").
90 See, e.g., Matthews et al., supra note 16, at 5839 (referring to "tiers" of
emissions).
91 See, e.g., CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, GUIDANCE NOTES 10 (2008),
available at http://www.syntao.com/Uploads/%7BOAD5353C-63DF-4396[hereinafter
A815-3B 197A899E5C%7DCDP_2008_GuidanceEnglish.pdf
CDP Guidance] (incorporating WRI/WBCSD Carbon Protocol and stating that it
includes in Scope 1 emissions "from GHG sources owned or controlled by the
.").
company, such as combustion facilities ...
92 See, e.g., id. at 10 (including emissions "that the company has indirectly
caused through its consumption of imported electricity, heat, cooling or steam"
in Scope 2).
9 Id. (defining Scope 3 emissions to be "[o]ther indirect emissions that are a
consequence of a company's activities, but which arise from GHG sources that
are owned or controlled by others").
94 See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying. text (discussing nascent
supply chain efforts).
95 We identify The Climate Registry as a private entity, but we recognize that
it has a strong public component. The Climate Registry was founded by a
number of participating U.S. and Mexican states, native sovereign nations, and
Canadian provinces and territories, known as "members." The Registry is
governed by its members, with one board member per state, province, or tribe
serving on the Board of Directors. Board Members are appointed by their
Major
respective Governors, Premiers, or other governing authorities.
companies from a variety of industries have joined the program. Participants

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 244 2010-2011

CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE

2010]

245

global private reporting scheme, the CDP, require participants to
report Scope I and 2 emissions but leave Scope 3 emissions to the
discretion of the reporting entity.96 In practice, it appears that few
firms choose to report emissions from suppliers. 97 Thus, although
supply chain emissions are explicitly a part of Scope 3 emissions,
with one partial exception" the leading private reporting systems
do not require Scope 3 reporting. 99
TABLE 2: BOUNDARIES IN PRIVATE VOLUNTARY CARBON EMISSIONS
REPORTING PROGRAMS
Program

Scope of Emissions Reporting Facility Threshold

The Climate Registry

Scope 1 and 2

None

WRI

Scope 1 and 2

None

CDP
GRI

Scope 1 and 2
Scope 1 and 2

None
None

In addition, although the private reporting standards seek to
include in the carbon footprint all emissions from the corporate
firm, including all entities owned or controlled by the firm,oo it is

unclear whether the participating firms are reporting emissions
from smaller facilities (e.g., facilities that emit less than 10,000 or
25,000 metric tons of CO 2eq). The standard-setting organizations
include National Grid, Wal-Mart, Amtrak, Rio Tinto, and numerous public
utilities and local governments. The Climate Registry, List of Members,
http://www.theclimateregistry.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
96 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL: ACCURATE,
TRANSPARENT, AND CONSISTENT MEASUREMENT OF GREENHOUSE GASES ACROSS
NORTH
AMERICA
32
(2008),
available
at
http://www.

theclimateregistry.org/downloads/GRP.pdf. The Climate Registry "does not add
Scope 3 emissions together or mix Scope 3 with Scope 1 or 2 emissions" because
of the potential double-counting of emissions. Id. at 34.
97 See Press Release, Carbon Disclosure Project, Supply Chain Report
Reveals Need to Improve Supplier Awareness of Business Threats From Climate
Change (Mar. 5, 2009), available at https://www.cdproject.net/enUS/WhatWeDo/CDPNewsArticlePages/Supply-Chain-Report-Reveals-Need-toImprove-Supplier-Awareness-of-Business-Threats-From-Climate-Change.aspx.
98 See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.

9 In fact, other downstream emissions (e.g., from the use rather than the
manufacture of a car) are also excluded, as are other forms of upstream
emissions.
' See CDP Guidance, supra note 91, at 1-2 (defining corporate entity).
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exhort firms not to select thresholds below which firms choose not
to report,10 but they do not prevent firms from setting thresholds
or from shifting activities to below-threshold facilities, and it is
unclear if firms are applying thresholds in practice.
a.

The Carbon DisclosureProject

The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a nongovernmental
organization headquartered in the United Kingdom with
The sponsors include hundreds of
worldwide sponsors.1 02
institutional investors, including leading banks, insurers, pension
funds, and other organizations representing several trillion dollars
in funds under management. 0 3 The CDP has been sending
information requests to the world's largest companies since 2003,
and in 2008 over 2,200 companies responded.104 According to the
'0 For example, the WRI Carbon Protocol discourages the use of a threshold
below which the carbon emissions from a facility or activity are not reportable.
WRI GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL INITIATIVE 1-3 (2008), available at
www.ghgprotocol.org/files/psp-draft-1.pdf. The initiative states that:
[A] threshold is often used to determine whether an error or omission is
a material discrepancy or not. This is not the same as a de minimis
thresholdfor defining a complete inventory. Instead, organizations need

to make a good faith effort to provide a complete, accurate, and
consistent accounting of their GHG emissions. For cases where
emissions have not been estimated, or estimated at an insufficient level
of quality, it is important that this is transparently documented and
justified. Verifiers can determine the potential impact and relevance of
the exclusion, or lack of quality, on the overall inventory report.
Id. (emphasis added).
DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SUPPLY CHAIN LEADERSHIP
102 See CARBON
COLLABORATION (SCLC) PILOT RESULTS AND FINDINGS REPORT 7 (2008),

available at https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDPSCLCPilotReport
.pdf [hereinafter CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SCLC PILOT RESULTS]
(describing the Carbon Disclosure Project as a "Special Project of Rockefeller
Philanthropy Advisors" with tax-exempt status in the United States).
103 As of February 2010, the CDP had 534 signatory investors that put their
name on the CDP voluntary disclosure form. This not only shows that investor's
direct support for the CDP but also allows them to access the non-public
information gathered by the CDP. Carbon Disclosure Project, About Us,
http://cdproject.net/aboutus.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). In 2008, there were
more than 2,220 companies responding to the CDP questionnaire (called
"responding companies"). Carbon Disclosure Project, Results Overview,
https://www.cdproject.netlen-US/Results/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Mar.
21, 2010); see also Carbon Disclosure Project, Resources, http://
cdproject.net/resources.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (including questionnaire
and all of CDP guidance documents).
Carbon Disclosure Project, Results Overview, https://www.cdproject
.net/en-US/Results/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
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CDP's Global 500 Report 2008, 77 percent of the top 500
companies worldwide responded to the requested questionnaire.105
The CDP makes the data available to its sponsoring organizations
and to the public over the Internet.106
The CDP requests disclosure of carbon emissions from
corporate entities.' 0 7 The CDP provides general guidance to
respondents, but for specifics refers them to the more detailed
Greenhouse Gas Protocol developed by the World Resources
Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WRI Carbon Protocol) and a private standard
developed by the International Standards Organization.' 0 8 To
calculate the emissions subject to disclosure, the CDP identifies
the three scopes discussed above, which are defined in the WRI
Carbon Protocol. The CDP draws on and follows the WRI Carbon
Protocol in requiring participants to report Scopes 1 and 2,109 and it
only suggests that participants voluntarily report Scope 3
emissions. 1
105

See CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, CDP 2008 GLOBAL 500 REPORT at ii

(noting that "[t]he overall response rate for CDP6 [2008] is 770/-consistent
with the record level achieved in CDP5 [2007]"), https://www.
cdproject.net/CDPResults/67_329_143_CDP%20Global%20500%20Report%20
2008.pdf.
106 Carbon Disclosure Project, About Us, http://cdproject.net/aboutus.asp (last
visited Feb. 27, 2010).
107 See CDP Guidance, supra note 91, at 1-2 (identifying methods for
respondents to determine which entities are subject to references in the survey
form to "your company" or "your business"). The CDP guidance states that:
[w]hen the questionnaire refers to 'your company' or 'your business,'
this should be treated as a reference to the group, company, companies
and/or businesses within the reporting boundary you identify in answer
to question 2(a)(i). The information provided in response to the
questionnaire should relate to all of the entities within the reporting
boundary identified and the same 'consolidation approach' should be
used for all of your answers.

Id.
108

Id. at 1 (referencing WORLD RES. INST. & WORLD Bus. COUNCIL FOR

SUSTAINABLE
ACCOUNTING

DEV.,
AND

THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL:
REPORTING
STANDARD
(2004),

http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf

A CORPORATE
available
at

[hereinafter

WRI

Carbon Protocol] and INT'L STANDARDS ORG. (ISO), 14064-1: SPECIFICATION
WITH GUIDANCE AT THE ORGANIZATION LEVEL FOR QUANTIFICATION
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND REMOVALS (2006)).
'9 See id. at 9.
"o Id. at 13-14 (detailing the "most significant Scope 3 sources"

AND

for a
participating company, including details on "employee business travel,"
"external distribution logistics," "use and disposal of company's products and
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The CDP and the Carbon Protocol are beginning to focus on
the importance of the supply chain, however. They recently
conducted studies on improving supply chain reporting and the
CDP has instituted the Supply Chain Leadership Collaboration
(SCLC) with the goal of creating a standardized process for supply
chain reporting of carbon emissions."' Similarly, the WRI Carbon
Protocol is a pilot program, testing new international standards for
calculating carbon emissions in corporate and product supply
chains. The new carbon standards will include product lifecycle
accounting and full organizational value chain Scope 3 emissions
reporting. 112
b.

The Global Reporting Initiative

The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a multi-stakeholder
process and institution whose mission is to develop and
disseminate globally applicable Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines.113 The GRI focuses on corporate-level reporting,
although it also includes reporting by NGOs and governmental
organizations. GRI Guidelines include Scope 1 and Scope 2
emissions. They encourage but do not require Scope 3 reporting
for the energy consumption associated with suppliers.1 14 The GRI
also encourages use of a reporting boundary that goes well beyond
services," and the "company supply chain"). Under the WRI Carbon Protocol,
participants "shall separately account for and report on [Levels] 1 and 2 at a
minimum," while Level 3 is optional. WRI/WBCSD Carbon Protocol, supra
note 89, at 25. For companies that report Scope 3 emissions, WRI provides
guidance on relevant emissions, such as those that "contribute to the company's
GHG risk exposure," are "deemed critical by key stakeholders," and that are
large "relative to the company's Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions." Id. at 30.
" CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SCLC PILOT RESULTS, supra note 101, at
2; see also CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SUPPLY CHAIN REPORT 2009 (2009),
available at https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/65_329_201_CDP-SupplyChain-Report_2009.pdf.
112 See Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative, Product and Supply Chain,
(last
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/product-and-supply-chain-standard
visited Feb. 27, 2010).
113 Global Reporting Initiative, What is Global Reporting Initiative?,
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI (last visited Feb 27,
2010).
114 GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, INDICATOR PROTOCOL SET: ENVIRONMENT

at
http://www.globalreporting.org/
available
13
(2006),
(EN)
ReportingFramework/ReportingFrameworkDownloads/ [hereinafter G3] (noting
that indicator EN7 covers "[i]ndirect energy use . .. through purchasing materials
and components or services such as travel, commuting, and subcontracted
production").
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the traditional firm," 5 as well as reporting by small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) that are suppliers to GRI reporters." 6 In
practice, however, few companies report supply chain emissions,
and few SMEs are reporters.' 17
In sum, the leading private reporting standards do not include
explicit thresholds on the size of the facilities subject to emissions
reporting, and it is unclear whether firms are excluding emissions
from small facilities by applying their own thresholds. Private
reporting standards focus on firm-level emissions and do not
require reporting of supply-chain emissions, however, and in
practice most firms do not report supply chain emissions." 8

11 Global
Reporting Initiative, Setting the Reporting Boundary,
http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G30nline/SettingReportB
oundary (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (noting that "[t]he Sustainability Report
Boundary should include the entities over which the reporting organization
exercises control or significant influence both in and through its relationships
with various entities upstream (e.g., supply chain) and downstream (e.g.,
distribution and customers)"). However, organizations have considerable
discretion over how they define "control" or "significant influence." If they do
not quantify such influence, GRI allows the reporter to provide a narrative
description. See id.
11 A recent report GRI supply chain report noted that "[t]he assumption,
based on GRI's experience and reporting reality, was that suppliers in emerging
economies, especially SMEs, face big barriers when it comes to understanding
and proactively managing sustainability issues."
GLOBAL REPORTING
INITIATIVE, SMALL, SMART, AND SUSTAINABLE 7 (2008), available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/02AF6322-C207-4F79-85B2EC017826B60F/O/SSSReport.pdf. GRI also has initiated the Global Action
Network for Transparency in the Supply Chain, which is for large firms "to
provide support to their suppliers, enabling the embedding of a transparent
sustainability reporting framework throughout the chain . . . ." Global Reporting
Initiative, Supply Chain, http://www.globalreporting.org/CurrentPriorities/
SupplyChain (last visited Feb.. 27, 2010).
"7 A 2006 survey conducted by GRI and KPMG's Global Sustainability
Services analyzed fifty sustainability reports of Financial Times top global 500
companies and GRI participants. We examined the sustainability reports of
those fifty companies and found that only five mention supply chain emissions in
their sustainability reports, thirteen note emissions due to employee travel,
fourteen report emissions from office products and company-owned real estate,
and seven provide quantitative data for any indirect emissions. See generally
KPMG & GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, REPORTING THE BUSINESS
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS (2007),
available at http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/C451A32E-AO46493B-9C62-7020325FIE54//ClimateChange GRIKPMGO7.pdf.

118 See Nine out of 10 Firms Ignoring Supply Chain Carbon Footprint,
BUSINESSGREEN.COM, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.businessgreen.com/business-

green/news/2237398/nine-ten-firms-ignoring-supply.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 249 2010-2011

250

N. Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 18

Public Reporting and Allowance-HoldingRegimes
Public regimes also typically require reporting, and a growing
number restrict emissions by requiring regulated entities to hold
allowances as part of a cap-and-trade *system. Public voluntary
and mandatory reporting and mandatory allowance-holding
requirements focus on the facility rather than the firm. We
summarize the carbon footprint boundary used in many of the
schemes in Table 3, and we examine the leading federal, regional,
state, and European Union schemes in more detail below.
2.

TABLE

3: BOUNDARIES IN PUBLIC CARBON EMISSIONS REPORTING
PROGRAMS

Program

Voluntary Reporting
EPA Climate Leaders

Scope of Emissions
Reporting

Threshold

CCAR

Scope I and 2
Scope 1 and 2

UK ETS (C&T)
En. Policy Act 1605(b)

Scope 1 and 2
None

10,000 tons

Mandatory Reporting
EPA Rulemaking
MA Global Warming Act
New Mexico

Scope 1
Scope 1, limited Scope 2
Scope 1, Scope 2121

25,000 tons"'
5,000 tons1 2 0
25 Megawatts/
10 tons1 22

Oregon
California

Scope 1
Scope 1

Washington

Scope 1

25,000 tons

25,000/2,500
tons123
10,000 tons1 2 4

119 Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed.
Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30,
2009) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042,
1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065).
120 See Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act, MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ch.
298, § 2(a)(2)a)(3) (2008).

121 N.M. ENV'T DEP'T, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING
MANDATORY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REPORTING FOR MAJOR SOURCES

UNDER PARTS 73 (20.2.73 NMAC) AND 87 (20.2.87 NMAC) at 1, 1-2 (2007),
available at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/aqb/ghg/documents/FAQGHG
_EmissionsReporting.pdf; see also Environmental Improvement Act, N.M.
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Mandatory Reporting
and Allowances
Waxman-Markey
RGGI
W. Climate Initiative

Scope 1 and 2125
Scope 1
Scope 1 and 2

EPA Rulemaking

Scope 1

25,000/10,000
tons126
25,000 tons 27

EU ETS

Scope 1 and limited
Scope 2128

Various Indus.
Facilities

a.

25,000 tons
25 Megawatts

Public Voluntary ReportingStandards

Public voluntary reporting standards resemble private
reporting standards. The EPA Climate Leaders program is a
voluntary initiative that requires participants to report Scope 1 and
2 emissions, 129 but not Scope 3 emissions. 130 As to Scope 3
emissions that are voluntarily included in a report, the EPA states
that "[c]ompanies should report those activities that are relevant to
their -business and goals, and for which they have reliable

STAT. ANN. § 74-1-8(A)(4) (West 1978), and Air Quality Control Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 74-2-1 to -2-22, (West 1978) (note specifically §§ 74-2-5(B)(1) &
74-2-5(C)(5)(d) & (e)).
122 N.M. ENV'T DEP'T, supra note 121, at 2.
123 See CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 17, § 95101 (2007).
124 See H.R. 2815,
60th Leg. § 5(a)
(Wash. 2008), available at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/2008CATdocs/IWG/tran/091108_ESSHB
2815.pdf.
125 The EPA Administrator is provided with
authority to expand reporting
requirements. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. § 713(b)(1)(G) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26,
2009).
126 The emissions threshold for regulation under the cap and trade initiative is
25,000 metric tons, and 10,000 tons for reporting. See W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE,
DRAFT DESIGN OF THE REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 3, 9 (2008),
availableat www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/WCldocs/072308_wci_draftdesign.
pdf.
127 See EPA, Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg.
56,260, 56,264 (Oct. 30, 2009).
128 Excludes carbon emissions associated with purchase of electricity.
Member states can elect to expand reporting requirements.
129 EPA,

CLIMATE LEADERS GREENHOUSE

GAS INVENTORY

DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
16
(2005),
available at
climateleaders/documents/resources/design-principles.pdf

PROTOCOL:

http://www.epa.gov/

130 Id. at 20.
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information."' 3 1 Voluntary reporting at the state level has
followed along the same lines. For example, the California
Climate Action Registry (CCAR) requires participants to report
only Scope 1 and 2 emissions, but not Scope 3 emissions.132
Participants are encouraged to report Scope 3 emissions, but such
reporting is optional and unverified.133
The Department of Energy manages a voluntary reporting
program under Section 1605(b) of the federal Energy Policy
Act.134 The program has few requirements, making reporting of all
emissions, regardless of scope, voluntary.' 3 5 Under this program,
emissions are treated as direct or indirect, with no mention of a
third level dealing with upstream emissions. Perhaps as a result,
the program is having little effect on the design of more recent
federal carbon reporting programs.136
The reluctance to include the supply chain in public voluntary
reporting schemes is not limited to the United States. For
example, the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a voluntary
emissions trading program that ended in 2006, directed
Reporting did
participants to report Scope 1 and 2 emissions.'
the program
and
2
emissions,
1
and
not go beyond Scope
guidelines directed that "the only type of indirect emissions in the
Scheme will be those associated with energy usage."

131

id
132CAL. CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL:
REPORTING ENTITY-WIDE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 3-4, 6 (2009) (requiring
participants to report direct or Level 1 emissions as well as indirect emissions
from purchased and consumed electricity use, imported steam, and district
heating and cooling).
133 Id. at 4, 21, 70-1 (explaining that voluntary Scope 3 emissions reporting
can "highlight" an "organization's environmental goals, policies, programs and
performance").
134 Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1605(b), 42 U.S.C. § 13385 (2006).
135See General Guidelines for the Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 10 C.F.R. § 300
(2009).
See Dawn Reeves, Lawmakers Seek to Enhance EPA's Role in Future
GHG Control Regime, INSIDE EPA, May 25, 2007, at 1, 14 (noting limits of
Department of Energy reporting program).
137UNITED KINGDOM DEP'T FOR ENV'T, FOOD, & RURAL AFFAIRS (DEFRA),
GUIDELINES FOR THE MEASUREMENT AND REPORTING OF EMISSIONS BY DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS INTHE UK EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 11 (2003).
138 Id. at 12.
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b.

Public Mandatory
Requirements

Reporting

and

253

Allowance-Holding

Mandatory reporting and allowance-holding requirements are
being developed at the federal level and are in place in a number of
states. All of these requirements follow the pattern of the private
standards: a carbon boundary that does not include suppliers. For
example, pursuant to a 2008 omnibus appropriations bill,' in
2009, the EPA finalized mandatory reporting requirements for
greenhouse gases produced by major sources in the United
States.140 The rule includes both upstream and downstream
provisions. The upstream provisions require reporting by suppliers
of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, petroleum products, and natural gas) or
industrial greenhouse gases (e.g., fluorinated gases) that will result
in 25,000 metric tons or more per year of CO 2eq emissions. 14 1 The
downstream provisions apply to facilities that emit 25,000 metric
tons or more per year and use the same threshold for
manufacturers of vehicles and engines.142 The downstream
provisions generally require reporting at the facility level, but
vehicle and engine manufacturers are required to report at the
corporate level.
The reporting requirements in the leading proposed federal
legislation also exclude supply chain and other Scope 3 emissions.
For example, the Waxman-Markey bill, which passed the House of
Representatives in 2009, includes a hybrid upstream and
downstream cap-and-trade scheme. Covered entities will have
tradable federal permits for each ton of pollution emitted. The bill
includes a 25,000 ton threshold for its emissions permit system and
a 10,000 ton threshold for its emissions reporting program. 143 The
13 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat.
1844 (2007) (requiring EPA to promulgate "mandatory reporting of greenhouse
gas emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the economy of the

United States"). See also Steven D. Cook, EPA Misses Deadlinefor Proposing
Rule to Require Reporting of Industrial Emissions, BNA DAILY ENV'T REPORT,

Oct. 1, 2008, at A-2.
14 See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260,
56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009).
141
142

id.
id.

143 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§
700(13)(B), 713(a)(2)(B)(ii) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26,
2009); see also Climate Security Act, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 1103(a) (2008).
The Lieberman-Warner bill would have required periodic reports detailing
annual and quarterly data from affected facilities, with a baseline of the three
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Lieberman-Warner bill, which was defeated on the floor of the
Senate in 2008, also includes reporting and allowance-holding
requirements, but it adopts a 10,000 ton threshold. 144 Facilities
under the threshold will not be subject to the reporting or
allowance-holding requirements.
In both bills, third party
suppliers are not included in the reporting or allowance-holding
requirements, although the EPA is authorized to expand the
requirements under certain conditions.14 5 Both bills also include
upstream reporting and allowance-holding provisions, although the
effect of the Lieberman-Warner bill's upstream provisions on
smaller facilities will be limited, because the bill places caps only
on fossil fuels used for transportation, not on fossil fuels used for
small stationary sources.146
Supply-chain emissions also are not included in the
mandatory reporting and allowance-holding regimes at the
regional or state level in the U.S. Ten northeastern states have
agreed to form the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
CO 2 Budget Trading Program, a uniform budget and allowance
trading program directed at large fossil fuel-fired electricity
generating units (those having a rated capacity of 25
megawatts). 147 Once a unit triggers coverage under RGGI, the
owner or operator of the unit must "record, report and qualityassure" data from systems monitoring its CO 2 emissions. 14 ' This
years 2004-2007. S. 2191 § 1103(d). The upstream components would have
required reporting by firms that extract or import transportation fuels that will
generate more than 10,000 tons of CO 2eq per year. S. 2191 § 4(7) (defining
"covered facility).
'" See S. 2191 §§ 1102(1)(A)-1102(1)(B) (noting that the definition of
"Affected Facility does not include any facility that is not a covered facility, is
owned or operated by a small business ... and emits fewer than 10,000 carbon
dioxide equivalents in any year"). The Kerry-Boxer bill includes a 25,000 metric
ton threshold. See Clean Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong. §
713(a)(2) (2009).
145 See S. 2191 § 1103(a)(8) (authorizing EPA to require additional reporting).
146 See supra note 143 (discussing transportation fuels upstream
provisions).
147 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, RGGI FACT SHEET
1-4,

available
at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGIExecutive%2OSummary
4.22.09.pdf; Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative
(Dec.
20,
2005),
available at
http://www.rggi.org/
docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf The participant states are Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Maine, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Rhode Island. Id.
148 RGGI FACT SHEET, supra note 147, at 1; see also Memorandum of
Understanding on the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 147.

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 254 2010-2011

CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE

2010]

255

reporting does not extend to Scope 2 or Scope 3 emissions,
although supply chain emissions are not a substantial issue for the
RGGI Trading Program since the program focuses on electricity
generating units, for which suppliers comprise less than 5 percent
of total carbon emissions nationwide. 149
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is another regional
emissions regulatory scheme. WCI has been developed by
California, several other western states, and several Canadian
provinces. The WCI includes a hybrid upstream and downstream
carbon cap-and-trade program, with an emissions threshold for
allowance-holding under the WCI of 25,000 metric tons of
CO 2eq.150 Mandatory reporting requirements are facility-specific,
and the facility reporting threshold is 10,000 metric tons,' 5 ' in
contrast to the 25,000 ton allowance-holding threshold.
To implement the regional initiatives, a number of states have
and allowance-holding
established mandatory reporting
requirements.
Under the Massachusetts Global Warming
Solutions Act,' 52 reporting is required for large emitting facilities,
but supply-chain emissions are not included. 5 3 Similarly, New
Mexico has instituted a mandatory carbon emissions reporting
program, which requires Scope 1 emissions to be reported for
2008,154 and Scope 2 emissions in 2009.155 In Oregon, recently
promulgated rules require reporting of Scope 1 direct emissions15 6
19 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 10-14.
150 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DRAFT DESIGN OF THE REGIONAL CAP-

http://www.
at
(2008),
available
PROGRAM
3
westemclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/0104Fl8808.pdf. The point of
regulation varies depending upon the source of the emissions. Id. at 6.
1'
Id. at 9.
152 Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions
Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 298,
§§ 2(a)(2)-(a)(3) (2008).
153 An owner or operator of a facility that is required to report under
the state
Clean Air Act, or that emits in excess of 5,000 tons CO 2eq must report annually.
Id. Voluntary emissions reporting is provided for other entities and facilities. Id.
§ 2(a)(4).
154 N.M. ENV'T DEP'T, supra note
121, at 1 (2007), available at
http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/aqb/ghg/documents/FAQ_GHG EmissionsRepo
rting.pdf.
Id. at 2 (stating that "[e]missions of GHG that occur at another location as
a result of the production of electricity, steam and heat purchased and consumed
at the facility must be reported").
156 OR. ADMIN. R. 340-215-0040 (2009) ("Any owner or operator required to
register and report under OAR 340-215-0030(1) and (2) must report direct
emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
AND-TRADE
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and provide for voluntary reporting of Scope 2 emissions,157 but
exclude Scope 3 emissions.158 California follows this pattern with
somewhat different thresholds, requiring reporting of Scope 1
emissions with thresholds of 25,000 and 2,500 tons, depending on
the type of emitting facility.159
A similar pattern holds with the mandatory reporting
component of the European Union cap-and-trade program. The
European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) creates a
hybrid upstream and downstream cap-and-trade program, and
requires emissions reporting from large facilities.' 6 0 The EU ETS
requires reporting for some Scope 2 emissions,16 1 but not
"emissions associated with the production of heat or electricity
imported from other installations."l 62 These latter emissions are
subject to direct reporting under the EU ETS.163 Although the
thresholds vary among the categories, in each case only large
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride greenhouse gases. . . ."); see also OR.
ADMIN. R. 340-215-0020 (2009) (distinguishing "direct" from "indirect"
emissions).
157 OR. ADMIN. R. 340-215-0030 (2009) ("Any owner or operator of a source
required to register and report greenhouse gas emissions annually under this
division may voluntarily include additional emissions from the previous calendar
year not required under this division, including but not limited to mobile
combustion and indirect emissions.")
i5 See OR. ADMIN. R. 340-215-0020 (2009) (defining "indirect emissions" to
include "emissions associated with the purchase of electricity, heating, cooling or
steam," not supply chain emissions).
5 The regulatory scope of AB 32 includes numerous large industrial sources.
See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95100-103 (2007).
160 Council Directive 2003/87/EC, Annex I, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC) (covering
"combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (except
hazardous or municipal waste installations)").
1 Commission Decision 2007/589/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 11 (EC) (stating
that "[m]onitoring and reporting for an installation shall cover all process and
combustion emissions from all emission sources and source streams belonging
to activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC ... and of all greenhouse
gases specified in relation to those activities while avoiding double-counting")
(emphasis added). Guidance from the EU defines "source stream" as "annual
flows of fuels, raw materials or products leading to greenhouse gas emissions."
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MONITORING AND REPORTING UNDER THE EU
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM PURSUANT DIRECTIVE 2003/87 at 3, available at

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/mrg2faqsep-2007.pdf.
162 Commission Decision 2007/589/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 11 (EC).
Other emissions sources are explicitly excluded from reporting
requirements, such as "[e]missions from mobile internal combustion engines for
transportation purposes." Id.
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industrial facilities are subject to reporting and allowance-holding
requirements.1 64 Member states may include in emissions
reporting additional Scope 2 emissions and Scope 3 emissions if
they so choose.165
B. The PhysicalBoundary
As discussed above, protocols for assessing the carbon
emissions from the production of goods typically divide the
emissions into three general categories: direct emissions (Scope 1),
emissions from purchased energy (Scope 2), and supply chain and
other indirect emissions (Scope 3). If the vast majority of
emissions arise from Scope 1 and 2 facilities, then reporting and
allowance-holding requirements focused on these facilities are
unlikely to miss substantial amounts of carbon. Upstream
provisions will capture small domestic facility emissions by
accounting for the emissions from fuel use but will not capture
emissions from small or large facilities abroad.
A recent study by Matthews et al. analyzed the carbon
emissions from all 491 economic sectors in the United States.166
The study concluded that a carbon footprint boundary that includes
only direct emissions and purchased energy emissions will capture
only 26 percent of the total emissions from the average sector. A
number of important economic sectors (roughly 10 percent of all
491 sectors) that have large carbon footprints (e.g., electric power
generation, cement manufacturing and transportation) have 80
percent or more of their emissions captured by a boundary that
only includes direct emissions and purchased energy emissions.
For example, the vast majority of the emissions from a large coalfired power plant occur from the plant's smokestacks, not from the
production of the coal and other inputs into the plant. For the other
1 The EU Emissions Trading Directive (ETD) regulates four categories of
installations: (1) Energy Activities; (2) Production and Processing of Ferrous
Metals; (3) Mineral Industries; and (4) Other Activities. Council Directive
2003/87, Annex 1, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC). The Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)
is based on the ETD. The directive came first, entering into force in 2003, and
the EU commenced the scheme in 2005. Id.
165 See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 24, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 38 (EC)
(allowing Member States to "apply emission allowance trading in accordance
with this Directive to activities, installations and greenhouse gases which are not
listed in Annex I, provided that inclusion of such activities, installations and
greenhouse gases is approved by the Commission. .
166 Matthews et al., supra note 15, at 5840.
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90 percent of sectors, however, just including direct and purchased
energy emissions will exclude a majority of their emissions, which
arise from the supply chain.16 7 For example, the direct and
purchased energy emissions of a book publisher represent just 6
percent of the total emissions associated with book production.
Much of the remaining 94 percent arises from the supply chain.16 8
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. For example,
an analysis by Timberland, the retail shoe firm, concluded that
only 4 percent of its carbon emissions arise from its companyowned production facilities and from employee travel. In. contrast,
emissions from Timberland's finished product suppliers and
inbound transportation are estimated to be nearly six times their
own carbon footprint, while the raw materials associated with their
products account for approximately 71 percent.169
A recent white paper by the staff *of the House Commerce
Committee provides additional insights into the characteristics of
the emissions from the supply chain.170 The report concludes that
electricity generation accounts for 34 percent of U.S. emissions,
transportation 28 percent, industry 19 percent, agriculture 8
percent, other commercial sources 6 percent, and residential
sources 5 percent.' 7 ' It also suggests that of the 350,000
manufacturing facilities in the U.S., less than 8,000 emit 10,000

167

Id.

'8 Id. For book publishers, post-production

emissions (e.g., from the delivery
of the books to stores and customers) also are large. Ultimately, the emissions
from the entire life cycle of a good, from production through use and disposal,
are important, but we focus upstream in the supply chain in this Article.
169 TIMBERLAND, TIMBERLAND CLIMATE STRATEGY 6, 15 (2009), availableat
http://www.timberland.com/corp/TimberiandClimateStrategy.2009_report.
pdf.
170STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 10. A
10,000 metric ton CO2eq threshold would account for 80 percent of emissions
from the manufacturing sector (while burdening 2.1 percent of facilities) and 100
percent of emissions from the electricity power sector (while burdening 35
percent of facilities). See Tristram 0. West & Naomi Pefia, Determining
Thresholds for Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 ENVTL.
Sci. & TECH. 1057, 1059; see also NICHOLAS INST. FOR POLICY SOLUTIONS, SIZE
THRESHOLDS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION 4-5 (2007), available at

www.nicholas.duke.edulinstitutellOKton.pdf (concluding that a 10,000 ton CO2
threshold would account for 99.9 percent of emissions from electricity power
sector and 58 percent of the U.S. facilities, and in the manufacturing sector, 2.3
percent of the facilities and 84.6 percent of emissions).
"' STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 7 fig.2.
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metric tons of CO 2 per year.' 72 The 10,000 metric-ton threshold
would account for 90 percent of the carbon emissions from the
electric utility industry, but it would exclude the vast majority of
other CO 2 emitting facilities in the United States.1 73 For example,
90 percent of the CO 2 emissions from the manufacturing sector
arise from six industries (petroleum and coal, chemicals, primary
metals, paper, nonmetallic mineral, and food), but a 10,000 metric
ton threshold would only regulate 10 percent (7,460) of the
facilities in this sector. 174 At the same time, this 10 percent of
facilities accounts for 80 percent of the CO 2 emissions from the
sector.17 5 To capture 95 percent of the CO 2 emissions from the
industrial sector, the threshold would have to be set at 1,000 tons
per year.176 None of the facilities in the commercial or residential
sectors exceed the 10,000 ton threshold.177 For example, as noted
by Matthews et al., direct emissions in the book publishing
industry only account for 6 percent of total emissions-with the
bulk of the remaining 94 percent being from the supply chain
(paper production) and transportation.
The figures for developing countries are likely to be quite
different. For example, roughly half of all Chinese carbon
emissions are from production for export, and roughly half of all
Chinese production for export is by township and village
enterprises (TVEs).178 These TVEs have ten or fewer employees,
and most if not all are likely to fall below either a 10,000 or 25,000
ton threshold.179 A substantial portion of Chinese carbon
emissions are thus likely to fall below the emerging common
carbon footprint boundary, if China were to adopt the boundary
without an upstream component.
C. Conclusion RegardingLegal and PhysicalBoundaries
A mismatch exists between the regulatory and physical
Id. at 10.
"' NICHOLAS INST. FOR POLICY SOLUTIONS, supra note 170, at 4.
172

174

West & Pena, supra note 170, at 1057 tbl. 1.

asId. at tbl.
17

3.
Id. at tbl. 1.

STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, supra note 17, at 18-20.
Jianguo Liu & Jared Diamond, China's Environment in a Globalizing
World, 435 NATURE, 1179, 1180-81, 1184 (2005); Vandenbergh, China
Problem, supra note 22, at 938-39.
179 Liu & Diamond, supra note 178, at 1180-81.
'

178
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boundaries. The details of private and public climate change
governance regimes differ, but these regimes are remarkably
similar in their core design. Private standards typically focus on
inducing large industrial firms and facilities to report their carbon
emissions, and public standards focus on requiring reporting from
facilities as well as requiring the facilities to hold carbon
allowances. For both private and public standards, by defining the
regulated entity only to include the final large industrial facility
that produces a good, roughly three-quarters of the emissions
associated with the production of the good are at risk of leaking
from the private and public regulatory regimes. 80 If these
emissions arise from domestic suppliers, they will be captured by
upstream provisions, but if they arise from foreign suppliers in
countries without cap-and-trade schemes, they will not be subject
to reporting or allowance holding requirements. We discuss the
implications of the mismatch for carbon emissions leakage in Part
III.
III. THE EFFECTS OF NARROW CARBON BOUNDARIES
The mismatch between the physical and legal boundaries of
greenhouse gas emissions discussed in Part II suggests the
potential for leakage from current and emerging public and private
climate change governance regimes. Continued use of the narrow
boundary in new international, federal, and state reporting and capand-trade schemes also may create incentives for far more leakage
in the future.
A.

Incentives

As discussed above, roughly three-quarters of the GHG
emissions from an average U.S. sector occur at locations upstream
from the final producing facility.' 8' The incentives of firms to
externalize the harms of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus the
extent to which leakage occurs, depends on the extent to which the
firms that comprise the three-quarters are not subject to regulation,
as well as the cost to firms of achieving this externalization
through shifting production within the firm or outsourcing carbonintensive production to third-party suppliers.
Supply-chain

1so See Matthews et al., supra note 16, at 5840.
"' See id.
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emissions may escape regulatory pressure because they occur from
a facility or activity that falls below regulatory thresholds in a
country with carbon emissions limits, because they occur in a
country without adequate limits, or because they occur in a country
with limits but inadequate enforcement. Restricting the public or
private carbon footprint boundary to the large industrial facilities
in the U.S. or EU thus creates incentives to shift existing or new
production to facilities or firms outside the scope of the public or
private regulatory regime. These incentives can be expected to
grow as private and public pressure for emissions reductions
increases.
Several factors may reduce the leakage that is arising or will
arise from the narrow firm boundary and thus also reduce the harm
from the current narrow boundary. For example, the leakage may
be limited by the transaction costs associated with shifting
production from regulated facilities to firms or facilities that are
unregulated or by inefficiencies in the production and transport of
goods made by other firms or facilities. If the costs of contracting
out the most carbon-intensive production exceed the costs of
reducing or buying credits for emissions, leakage may not occur in
the first place.
To deal with the leakage problem, domestic legal measures
and international agreements have sought to include upstream
provisions in cap-and-trade programs and impose allowance
requirements for imported goods.182 A number of proposed or
adopted U.S. and EU trading schemes include upstream cap-andtrade elements, which could reduce incentives for domestic
leakage from larger to smaller facilities. Although some of the
proposed trading schemes also include allowance-holding
requirements for importers, none has been included in an existing
scheme, and the viability of these programs in the face of a trade
challenge is uncertain.183
182 See Stavins, supra note 8, at 317-18 (describing comprehensive, upstream
provision as an aspect of U.S. cap-and-trade program that will most effectively
reduce leakage); see also NANCY OLEWILER, PAC. INST. FOR CLIMATE
SOLuTIONs, A CAP AND TRADE SYSTEM FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS IN BC 5-6 (2008) (describing an using an upstream point of

regulation to deal with leakage, as used by the Western Climate Initiative),
availableat www.pics.uvic.ca/assets/pdf/Cap%20and%2OTrade.pdf.
183 See TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., LEVELING
THE
CARBON
PLAYING
FIELD
31,
available
at
http://pdf.

wri.org/levelingthescarbon-playing

field.pdf (referencing the debate over
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Leakage

Experts disagree on the extent to which leakage is occurring
and is likely to occur in the future, but many conclude that
substantial leakage is likely in both cases. We examine the
available studies that assess the evidence of leakage via
outsourcing. We then turn to studies that attempt to predict the
effects of carbon governance regimes.
1.

Recent Trends

Although it is not possible to establish a causal link between
carbon concerns and offshoring, the past decade has seen a
significant rise in imports into the U.S. and EU of items associated
with "energy-expensive" and "pollution-causing"' 84 production
processes, and several studies suggest a link between pressure on
firms in industrialized countries to reduce emissions and
production outsourcing. Although not directly linking regulatory
programs to production outsourcing, Bin and Harriss conclude that
14 percent of China's 2003 emissions were generated in the
production of goods for export to the U.S., and they conclude that
net global carbon dioxide emissions increased by 720 million
metric tons because of China's international trade.' 85 The net
increase is the product of more carbon-intensive production in
China than in the importing country and carbon emissions
associated with transportation over long distances. Weber points
out that "[b]etween 1997 and 2004, imports into the U.S. increased
"whether trade measures being discussed would pass WTO muster"); CAROLYN
FISCHER & ALAN K. Fox, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, COMPARING POLICIES TO
COMBAT EMISSIONS LEAKAGE: BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS VERSUS REBATES 2
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1345928 (recognizing "many trade
law experts have concerns that such trade measures may not be compatible with
World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations...").
184 See Rhitu Chatterjee, Outsourcing U.S. Greenhouse-Gas Emissions,
13,
2007, at 4834, available at
ENVTL. ScI.
& TECH., June

http://www.sehn.org/tccOutsourcingUSgreenhousegasemissions.html.
1ss See Shui Bin & Robert C. Harriss, The Role of C02 Embodiment in USChina Trade, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 4063, 4066 (2006); see also Joseph Kahn &
Mark Landler, China Grabs West's Smoke-Spewing Factories,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

21,

2007,

at

Al,

available

at

http://www.nytimes.com

/2007/12/21/world/asia/21transfer.html (concluding that China "produces and
ekports so many goods once made in the West that many wealthy countries can

boast of declining carbon emissions, even while the world's overall emissions
are rising quickly").
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by 128 percent, most of which were energy-expensive, pollutioncausing products, such as electric and electronic goods, machinery,
and equipment," and attributes U.S. success in curbing emissions
relative to consumption to this increase in imports.' 86
A similar pattern has been observed in the United Kingdom.
UK emissions were 15 percent below 1990 levels by 2005, a
performance that exceeded the UK's Kyoto obligations.' 87
According to Watson and Moll, however, "the same products are
being consumed but the UK is increasingly importing the more
Watson and Moll
pressure-intensive of these [products]."'8
conclude that the emissions reductions are largely the result of
outsourcing the most carbon intensive extraction and production
processes to developing countries such as China.1 89 They also
conclude that "[i]f all the GHG emissions associated with the life
cycle of goods which are consumed in the UK were added up and
monitored over time, UK-driven GHG emissions" would have
increased 19 percent between 1990 and 2006.190 Recent studies
have shown similar statistics for Sweden, Norway, and other
developed countries.' 9 1
186

Chatterjee,supra note 184, at 4834 (citing Christopher L. Weber & Scott

H. Matthews, Embodied Environmental Emissions in U.S. International Trade,
1997-2004, ENVTL. Sci. & TECH., June 13, 2007). The view that decreases in the

industrialized world's emissions have come as a result of outsourcing production
overseas is not universal. Although addressing air pollution generally, not
carbon emissions, Levinson concludes that changes in technology, not the mix of
goods produced, accounts for most of the decline in pollution from US
manufacturing.
ARIK LEVINSON, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, TECHNOLOGY,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND POLLUTION FROM U.S. MANUFACTURING 12 (2007),

available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1007305.
187 DAVID WATSON & STEPHAN MOLL, ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS AND
DISADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC SPECIALISATION WITHIN GLOBAL MARKETS, AND

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

SCP

MONITORING

2

(2008),

available

at

http://eea.eionet.europa.eu/Public/irc/eionet-circle/etc waste/library?l=/
namea report/watson score-paperpdf/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
188
189

Id.

Id.

190 Id.; see also Bin & Harriss, supra note 185, at 4066 (noting a similar

increase of 12 percent for the U.S. based on the life cycle of U.S.-driven GHG
emissions).
191 WATSON & MOLL, supra note 187, at 2. Chatterjee explicitly draws a link
between regulation of industry and outsourcing of production, but does not
specifically cite carbon caps or reporting as the catalyst moving production
outside of reporting regimes. He asserts "over the last two decades ... industries
in industrialized countries" have moved "to developing countries to avoid strict
safety and health regulations." Chatterjee, supra note 184, at 4834. See also
Andrew Schatz, Note, Regulating Greenhouse Gases by Mandatory Information
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Future Leakage

Multiple studies have attempted to predict future leakage rates
under various carbon reporting and allowance-holding programs,
but many suggest that it may be roughly 10 to 20 percent of
targeted country emission reductions.' 92 Some estimates are much
higher. For example, Babiker suggests that under emissions caps,
"significant relocation of energy-intensive industries away from
the OECD may occur, depending on the type of market structure,
with leakage rates as high as 130 percent, in which case GHG
control policies in the industrialized countries actually lead to
higher global emissions." 93
Other researchers have focused on the U.S. and have reached
similar conclusions. Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih estimate a 25
percent leakage rate for U.S. emissions reductions given a $10 per
ton carbon dioxide price. The leakage figure reaches as high as 40
percent for energy-intensive industries such as chemicals,
nonmetallic mineral products, and primary metals.194 Fischer and
Fox estimate leakage by sector ranging as low as 8 percent in
electricity; 11 percent for pulp, paper, and print industries; and 14
percent for iron and steel.195 However, they estimate higher
percentages for energy-intensive goods, such as 20 percent for the
chemicals sector, 39 percent for nonmetallic minerals, and as much
as 64 percent for refined petroleum products.
Disclosure, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 335, 357-58 (2008).
192 Brian C. Murray et al., Estimating Leakage
From Forest Carbon

Sequestration Programs2-3 (Research Triangle Institute, Working Paper 02_06,
2002), available at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~carsonvs/papers/817.pdf.
For
example, several years ago, the IPCC studied the leakage potential from
industrialized to developing countries, and concluded that leakage "in the order
of five-twenty percent" was possible. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERSCLIMATE
CHANGE
2001:
MITIGATION
11
(2001),
available at

http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/pdf/WG3-SPM.pdf.
The IPCC also
found that "[a]ctual leakages are likely to be small. Leaky emissions reduction
appears to be more of a diversionary tactic rather than a real reason for
industrialized nations to withhold support for action on climate change." KEVIN
A. BAUMERT & NANCY KETE, WORLD RES. INST., WILL THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
DRIVE INDUSTRY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 2 (2002), available at

http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_1ibrary/feature/clifeacarbon.pdf.
193 Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and
Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT'L ECoN. 421, 421 (2005).
194 MuN S. HO ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, IMPACT OF CARBON PRICE

POLICIES

ON

U.S.

INDUSTRY

at

iv

(2008),

available

at

http://

www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationlD=20680.
19s FISCHER& Fox, supra note 181, at 19.
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The leakage studies do not reach uniform conclusions. For
example, an Australian study conducted for The Climate Institute
concludes that carbon leakage "is likely to be partial and has been
widely exaggerated."l 96 The Carbon Trust recently released a
study that "quantifies, for the first time, the impact of the EU
emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) on business competitiveness
across the UK at a business sub-sector level."' 97 The study
concludes that "UK and EU competitiveness will not be damaged"
as "'leakage' . . . is likely to represent no more than one per cent of
total EU CO 2 emissions." 98
For the most part, however, these studies suggest that a
substantial amount of leakage may already be occurring and may
occur in the future in certain industries, although disagreements
exist about the extent of the problem. Importantly, many existing
studies rely upon data that are now nearly ten years old (and in
some cases older) and are hence based on outdated production
figures for the developing economies. Moreover, previous models
of leakage in the context of exports (e.g., NAFTA) have proven
highly unreliable, often dramatically underestimating the amount
of leakage that would occur.' 99 Part of the difficulty in predicting
the effect of NAFTA was the fact that the models cannot
adequately predict large changes in trade in sectors that previously
had little or no trade.200
None of this demonstrates a cause-and-effect relationship, but
combined with the simple logic that placing a price on carbon
through private or public measures will induce firms to reduce
costs, it suggests that boundary-induced leakage is a substantial
196 Lenore Taylor, Warning over ETS Windfalls for Industry, AUSTRALIAN,

Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,243633865013871,00.html.
197 Press Release, The Carbon Trust, EU ETS To Have Marginal Impact on
Competitiveness of EU Industry (Jan. 15, 2008), availableat
http://www.carbontrust.co.uk/news/news/archive/2008/Pages/EUETS.aspx.
198

Id.

199 TIMOTHY J. KEHOE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS RESEARCH
DEP'T STAFF REPORT 320, AN EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF APPLIED
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS OF THE IMPACT OF NAFTA 1-3 (2003),

availableat http://www.econ.umn.edu/-tkehoe/papers/NAFTAevaluation.pdf.
200 Id. at 18 (citing the example of Canada, where exports of motor vehicles
jumped from 0.01 percent of Canadian exports to Mexico in 1988, to 5.06
percent in 1999, and where aluminum went from 0 percent to 1.33 percent). A
model based on previous production and demand is unlikely to predict such
changes.
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concern today. Moreover, the economic and social cost to firms of
carbon emissions is likely to increase, at least in developed
countries, through the expansion of public cap-and-trade schemes
and the tightening of caps. Even if only 10 to 20 percent leakage
occurs, this could have serious adverse effects on the ability to
reduce global emissions by 50 to 80 percent or more.
In addition, leakage in the 10 to 20 percent range may
generate substantial economic incentives for China and other
major developing countries to resist adoption of a post-Kyoto
agreement with mandatory emissions limits for all countries. 20 1
Not only does the potential for leakage to China reduce its
incentive to agree to mandatory limits, but since a large portion of
emissions are likely to come from TVEs and other small sources,
this further exacerbates China's incentives. This large share from
small sources will pose a particular challenge for any Chinese
regulatory response, since small sources are likely to fall below
most thresholds for cap-and-trade schemes, making it even harder
for China to meet overall targets and putting further pressure on
their large industrial facilities.
IV. A BROADER BOUNDARY
For the purposes of this article, we assume that a new
corporate carbon footprint boundary should achieve three
objectives: environmental effectiveness, economic effectiveness,
To enhance environmental
and distributional justice.202
effectiveness, the new carbon disclosure strategy should reduce
existing incentives for leakage and create new incentives for
private firms, and ultimately the major developing countries, to
reduce emissions. To enhance economic effectiveness, it should
do so at low cost. To achieve distributional justice, it should have
a favorable impact on poverty levels in developing and developed
countries as compared to alternative strategies. To achieve
If China commits to mandatory emissions reductions, it will be forced to
confront its total national emissions, including emissions from both large
industrial facilities and TVEs and other small sources, which make up a large
portion of Chinese emissions. This large share from small sources will pose a
particular challenge for any Chinese regulatory response, since small sources are
likely to fall below most thresholds for cap-and-trade schemes.
202 See Stavins, supra note 8, at 303 (including environmental effectiveness,
cost effectiveness, and distributional equity as three criteria for cap-and-trade
policies).
201
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widespread firm behavior change, the Coasian literature suggests
the value of clear entitlements, adequate information, and
opportunities for monitoring and enforcement.
Our proposed disclosure strategy should be compared to other
strategies that have a genuine prospect of influencing the
incentives of the major developing countries in the near term. The
list of viable strategies that have been discussed in the literature to
date (e.g., additional headroom allowances, subsidies, border
adjustments, and moral suasion) is remarkably short given the
importance of promptly reversing the rapid growth trend in
developing country emissions.
A.

Proposed CarbonDisclosureStrategy

The key elements of our carbon disclosure strategy are as
follows:
Supply-Chain Reporting.

Public

and private reporting

schemes in the U.S. and EU should be expanded to require
reporting of carbon emissions from the supply chain. The
reporting should be required of third party suppliers and firm
facilities without regard to whether the supplier or facility is
domestic or foreign.20 3 The requirement need not be to report all
carbon emissions, but it should require a good faith effort to
include the substantial majority of all emissions. Although
stipulating a threshold (e.g., 80 or 90 percent of supply chain
emissions) in theory assumes that a first assessment has been
performed to determine total emissions, reasonable judgment can
be used to assess whether the estimate includes the substantial
majority of all emissions and the judgment can be verified by a
third party.204
For some purposes, it is important to know carbon emissions throughout
the supply chain. For international accounting purposes, we also need a measure
of country-by-country emissions, however. Thus, reporting regimes would need
to report supply chain emissions separately.
204 A wide range of techniques can be used to increase the likelihood of
accurate reporting. See infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text. An
example of efforts to develop effective supply chain carbon reporting standards
is the Scope 3 Accounting and Reporting Standards under development by WRI
and the World Business Council as a part of the long-term effort to develop and
refine the Greenhouse Gas Protocol. See Bill Pritchard, Companies Testing
203

Standardsfor MeasuringEmissionsfrom Products, Supply Chains, BNA DAILY

REP., Jan. 21, 2010, at Al l (noting that sixty foreign and U.S. firms in
twenty industry sectors are testing the proposed new standards); see also GHG
PROTOCOL INITIATIVE, SCOPE 3 ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD,
ENv'T
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Private *schemes can be adopted quickly based on the
experience with calculating supply chain contracting emissions of
a number of firms under the CDP, GRI, and other schemes. Public
schemes at the national and sub-national level in the U.S. and EU
may take more time, but they also can be adopted fairly quickly.
Although in some cases statutory changes will be necessary, in
many cases the federal and state public regulatory agencies already
have or are likely to be given the statutory authority in the near
future to apply the broader carbon footprint boundary we
recommend. For example, the congressional directive for the EPA
to develop a reporting regulation gives the agency broad discretion
to establish the facility boundary.2 05 Similarly, the WaxmanMarkey and Lieberman-Warner bills would give the EPA broad
discretion to establish a corporate carbon reporting boundary that
adds reporting requirements for facilities that emit less than the
statutory thresholds.2 0 6 The adoption should occur quickly given
the time necessary for implementation of reporting schemes.
Speed also is important because several of the major developing
countries are shifting toward domestic consumer-driven economies
and are moving away from export-driven economies.2 07 Although
export pressure will continue to be influential, the major
developing countries may become less dependent on foreign trade
and less responsive to export market pressures over the next
several decades.
Product Labeling. We also propose the development and
expansion of public and private product carbon labeling programs
in the U.S., EU, and other developed countries. Product carbon
labeling will draw on much of the same data as corporate carbon
footprints, and the two disclosure modes will be mutually
supportive, enhancing the extent to which firm and product
reporting can be compared and verified. The feasibility of product
carbon labeling has been demonstrated by Timberland and other
(2009), available at
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghg-protocol-scope-3-standard-draft-forstakeholder-review-november-2009.pdf.
205 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121
Stat. 1844 § 285 (2007).
206 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
714(b)(2)(B)(ii) (as passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009); Climate
Security Act, S. 2191, 11 0th Cong. § 1103(a) (2008).
207 Worldwatch Institute, Moving Toward a Less Consumptive Economy,
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/812 (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
REVIEW DRAFT FOR STAKEHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP
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companies in the U.S., and it is widespread among firms in the UK
and Europe. 208 For example, Tesco and other major grocers in the
UK have announced goals of carbon labeling all products within
several years.209 Japan launched a labeling program in April
2009,210 and other countries are developing or considering labeling
programs. 211
As with corporate carbon footprints, product carbon labeling
schemes should be applied to products without regard to country of
origin, and standards should be developed to enable reasonable,
good faith, comparable, and verifiable estimates to be made.
Limits can be placed on the scope of the required reporting to the
extent necessary to speed adoption and reduce transaction costs.
For example, a default level of emissions could be established by
type of product, size of facility, or production process based on the
"worst in class" in order to provide an incentive for firms to verify
their superior performance when it is in their financial interest to
do so (i.e., when the potential benefits in terms of increased
product demand exceed the costs of testing and verification). This
would reduce the burden of the labeling standards in a way that
allows for speedy and efficient adoption. In addition, the label
should be designed to reflect the best social science regarding the
influence of label design on consumer behavior. 2 12
208 Perhaps two numbers should be generated: (1) a
total of emissions
associated with the product, which will facilitate consumer preference
satisfaction; and (2) a total associated with the product that is not otherwise
accounted for by another facility, which will facilitate efficient public regulatory
carbon emissions reductions schemes and private shareholder and other pressure
without double-counting.
209 See Vandenbergh, supra note 22,
at 941.
2Mo See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 261 (2d ed. 2009) (noting
the potential importance of carbon labels).
211 See, e.g., Posting of James Kanter to N. Y Times
Green Inc. Blog, Do You
Want to See a Carbon Label on Your Food and Drink? (Oct. 11, 2007, 10:57
EST)
http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/do-you-want-to-see-acarbon-label-on-your-food-and-drink/?scp=1&sq=carbon%201abeling%
20france&st-cse (noting that the French government is seeking mandatory
labeling within three years).

See generally W. KIP ViscusI, PRODUCT RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL
(1993). See also Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, EcoLabeling for Energy Efficiency and Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of US
Programs, 31 ENERGY POL'Y 109, 109 (2003) (suggesting that government
212

RESPONSIBILITY

programs are often more successful than private programs and simple seals are
more effective than complicated information).
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In theory, the label should include the anticipated carbon
emissions from the use of the product, not just from its production
and sale. This would require a lifecycle assessment that would
involve making judgments about product usage. Such an analysis
would require additional assumptions about consumer-related
factors such as frequency of use, life expectancy, misuse, or use
for unintended purposes that might not be universal across
consumers (especially in different countries). If the product
operated on electricity, it would also require assumptions about the
carbon intensity of local electricity production. This is not unlike
the analysis that goes into Energy Star labels that attempt to
calculate a typical annual cost of energy consumption for
products.2 13 Although this is our preferred approach, the urgency
of developing a carbon labeling scheme that influences suppliers
beyond the reach of current regulatory schemes is sufficiently
great that labeling requirements should not wait to overcome the
cost and resistance that estimates of emissions from usage are
likely to generate.
In combination, these two carbon disclosure instruments will
have the effect of expanding firm carbon reporting boundaries,
thus helping to shape and clarify emerging norms regarding
corporate carbon emissions to include carbon emissions arising
throughout the supply chain. Disclosure will address current
limitations in available information about carbon emissions,
enabling customers, NGOs, investors, employees, managers, and
others to understand, compare, and act based on the carbon profile
of firms and products. The carbon disclosure strategy should
complement, not displace, cap-and-trade headroom allowances,
subsidies, moral suasion, and other means of inducing developing
countries to reduce emissions.
B.

EnvironmentalEffectiveness

To meet the environmental effectiveness objective, our carbon
disclosure strategy should be reasonably easy to adopt and
implement. It also should reduce firni incentives to offshore
carbon-intensive production, facilitate social license pressure on
firms to impose requirements on suppliers, reduce supplier
"' See ENERGY STAR, How a Product Earns the ENERGY STAR Label,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfim?c=products.prhow eam (last visited Mar.
29, 2010).
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emissions, and provide positive incentives for major developing
countries to reduce their carbon emissions.
Viability. How viable is our proposed carbon disclosure
strategy? Of course, if policymakers give climate mitigation low
priority and urgency, any remedy with some political and
economic costs will be rejected. For those policymakers who are
seeking to reduce carbon emissions from developed and
developing countries at low cost, however, the question is how a
carbon reporting regime compares to other viable options.2 14
Further work will be required to evaluate the costs and efficacy of
various options, but our carbon disclosure strategy is likely to fall
on the low end of the cost spectrum, to be among the least
intrusive options, to reach across national boundaries without
triggering sovereignty concerns, and to have a low risk of leading
to trade protectionism complaints.
At the federal level, broad boundaries inevitably will trigger
opposition from industry sectors that have a comparative
disadvantage based on their current production patterns, and it will
be necessary to demonstrate that supply chain emissions can be
calculated at costs that do not overwhelm the benefits of reduced
leakage. Nevertheless, if some form of cap-and-trade scheme is
seen as inevitable at the federal level, industry could view broad
boundaries as the best way to retain a competitive posture while
inducing China and other developed countries to reduce emissions.
States and local governments could view adoption of a broad
boundary in the interim as a means to stimulate the development of
a more efficient and effective federal and global system. If
alternative mechanisms such as emission taxes or consumption
taxes regain serious consideration, broader boundaries will have
similar benefits.
An additional comparative advantage of the carbon disclosure
strategy is that it can begin in the short term, in some cases with a
minimum of government action. Private carbon labeling programs
exist now and a recently announced major new sustainability label

We do not argue that a social license-driven approach is the most efficient
option, only that it is one of the few viable approaches that have the prospect of
prompt, substantial carbon emissions reductions at low cost. See Eric A. Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1743 (1996)
(concluding that legislatures and courts often generate rules that are more
efficient than group norms).
214
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project may accelerate policy development in this area. 2 15 The
efforts of numerous private governance organizations and firms
demonstrate that carbon labeling of consumer goods is possible.
In addition to investor-based institutions such as the CDP, some
organizations have already begun to rate branded products by their
carbon footprint in an effort to affect consumer behavior. 216 As
discussed above, Tesco, in partnership with the Carbon Trust, has
created a consumer label that states how many grams of carbon or
equivalent greenhouse gases were emitted as a result of growing,
manufacturing, transporting, and storing the individual product.2 17
The label also takes into account the impact of preparing, using,
and disposing of the good. Some labels also include a carbon
comparison guide for other similar products and tips on how to
reduce the item's carbon footprint. An emerging online tool for
GoodGuide currently
carbon ratings is GoodGuide.com. 2 18
includes the health, environmental, and social impacts of rated
products and plans to include carbon comparisons in the future.219
More reliable and consistent data would facilitate such private
efforts. Existing green labeling programs can also be expanded or
reshaped to place a greater emphasis on carbon emissions. 22 0
Public labeling initiatives are likely to take longer, but the
Waxman-Markey bill already includes a provision that would

215 See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart to Assign New 'Green' Ratings - Labeling
Program Requires All Suppliers to Calculate and Disclose the Environmental
Costs of Producing Goods, WALL ST. J. (Brussels), July 17, 2009, at 4; see also
Marc Gunther, Wal-Mart to Become Green Umpire, BIG MONEY, July 13, 2009,

http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/judgments/2009/07/13/wal-mart-becomegreen-umpire (noting major sustainability index label effort with researchers
from Duke, Harvard, Stanford, and the University of California-Berkeley).
216 See, e.g., Good Guide, www.goodguide.com (last visited Aug. 4, 2009).
217 Tesco,
Rolling
Out Carbon Labeling, http://www.tesco.com/
greenerliving/greenerjtesco/what tesco is doing/carbon_1abelling.page?
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2009); see also Carbon Trust, The Carbon Reduction Company,
http://www.carbon-label.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
218 See Good Guide, supra note 216.
219

id.

See, e.g., A Carbon Label for California, http://www.carbonlabelca.org
(last visited Mar. 27, 2010); New York State Environmental Disclosure (Label)
Program, http://www.dps.state.ny.us/EnvDisclosureLabel.htm (last visited Mar.
220

27, 2010); see also KATHERINE N. PROBST, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, COMBATING
GLOBAL WARMING ONE CAR AT A TIME: CO 2 EMIssIoNS LABELS FOR NEW
http://www.rff.org/
1
(2006),
available at
MOTOR
VEHICLES

rff/News/Features/upload/21680_1.pdf.
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require EPA to study product carbon labeling.221
Social License Pressure. Our proposal for both corporate-

level disclosure and product labeling will likely affect the contours
of the carbon constraint in the social license to operate, as well as
stakeholder monitoring and enforcement of the carbon
constraint. 222 Carbon labels and corporate carbon footprints may
influence firm decision-making by directly influencing consumer
In addition, firms may respond to
purchasing decisions.
legitimacy or reputational concerns arising from reactions by
customers, NGOs, investors, and community members, and to the
prescriptive norms of firm employees and managers. 223 For
example, NGOs have successfully used environmental information
to organize boycotts, which have influenced firm decision-making
in a number of areas.224
As to the effects of corporate carbon footprints, empirical
studies have not yet evaluated the influence of carbon disclosure
221 American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 274
(as passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009).

222 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 349, 392-97 (1997) (noting the effect of laws

on norm formation and enforcement). The research and standards developed by
CDP, GRI, and other private carbon reporting schemes suggest that it is feasible
to calculate the carbon emissions from a firm and its suppliers. In addition, a
number of firms have done so, including more than half a dozen firms that report
Scope 3 carbon emissions to the CDP.
223 See, e.g., Shih-Chi Chiu & Mark Sharfinan, Legitimacy, Visibility, and the
Antecedents of Corporate Social Performance: An Investigation of the
Instrumental Perspective, 20 J. MGMT. 1, 5 (2009) (noting the importance to

firms of maintaining organizational legitimacy). Although environmental
information strategies face limitations, see, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 21, 141 (2001), a

number of studies suggest that they can have substantial effects on firm behavior.
See, e.g., Dara O'Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental
Systems ofLabor Standardsand Monitoring, 31 POL'Y STUD. J. 1 (2003) (noting

effects of shareholder activism against multinationals on labor standards of
supply chain contractors); Debora Spar & L.T. LaMure, The Power ofActivism:
Assessing the Impact ofNGOs on Global Business, 45 CAL. MGMT. REv. 78, 82-

5 (2003) (noting the effect of shareholders, NGOs, and consumers on
environmental conduct of supply chain contractors).
224 See generally, e.g.,
MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS:
EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGH THE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA (1999);

Dennis E. Garrett, The Effectiveness of Marketing Policy Boycotts:
Environmental Opposition to Marketing, 51 J. MARKETING 46 (1987); David P.
Baron, Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts 2-3, 33

(Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1766, 2002)
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-367261 (noting the use of market pressure
tactics by NGOs and their effects on firm international behavior).
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on firm carbon emissions, but the size of the corporate voluntary
carbon offset market and anecdotal accounts suggest that firms are
experiencing social license pressures to reduce carbon emissions
long before formal legal requirements are adopted.225 In addition,
in a roughly analogous setting, firms that were identified in Toxics
Release Inventory data releases as being among the highest
emitters of toxic chemicals in their industrial sectors experienced
an abnormal negative effect on firm stock, value. 226 Despite the
absence of a legal requirement to reduce emissions, the firms
subsequently reduced emissions more than those who were among
the lowest emitters, and the reductions occurred even though the
emissions reductions were not legally mandated.2 27
The effect of corporate carbon footprint disclosure on retail
consumer behavior is likely to be limited, but additional pressure
may arise from corporate customers, NGOs, and investors. Studies
demonstrate that substantial pressure for improved firm
environmental behavior arises from individual investors, public
pension funds, and socially responsible investment (SRI) funds.228
Public pension funds hold over $2.2 trillion in assets, or 33 percent
of all U.S. pension assets.22 9 Many firms have been the subject of
See, e.g., Therese Dunphy, Embracing Sustainability, AGGREGATES
MANAGER, May 1, 2008, available at http://www.aggman.com/embracingsustainability ("Mindful of the importance of maintaining their social license to
operate, many aggregate companies include sustainability and sustainable
development among their core values.").
226 See James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market
Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
98, 108-109 (1995); Konar & Cohen, supra note 78, at 109; see also Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging
Approach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
225

MANAGEMENT-BASED
STRATEGIES
FOR
PERFORMANCE 3, 9-10 (Cary Coglianese

IMPROVING

ENVIRONMENTAL

& Jennifer Nash eds., 2006)
(discussing state Toxic Release Inventory analogues); Mark A. Cohen, Empirical
Research on the DeterrentEffect ofEnvironmentalMonitoring and Enforcement,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,245, 10,250 (reviewing empirical literature); Winston
Harrington, Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted, 37 J. PUB.
ECON. 29, 49 (1988) (noting threat of bad publicity may incentivize firms to
comply in the absence of penalties).
22 See Konar & Cohen, supra note 78.
228 See Jason Scott Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and
Economics of Market Incentives for CorporateEnvironmental Performance 8891 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 05-16,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-725103 (reviewing studies of the
effects of socially responsible investors).
229 Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at
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shareholder resolutions seeking corporate carbon disclosure in
recent years, and a number of them have been withdrawn after the
firm agreed to take additional disclosure or emissions reduction
steps.230
Corporate carbon footprint disclosure also may affect the
extent of social license pressure from other sources. Firms
respond to the norms of community members upon whom the firm
depends for goodwill, including neighbors and community leaders
with whom company employees and managers may interact on a
frequent basis, and local government officials who may influence
future permitting, zoning, and other approvals. 23 1 The norms of
employees and managers whose recruitment and retention is
important to the firm's economic success also appear to be
influential.2 32 Although the extent of these social license pressures
is often difficult to discern, studies suggest that they are common
and affect firm environmental behavior when they occur.233
As to the effects of product carbon labels, there is growing
support for the proposition that carbon labeling induces firms to
reduce carbon emissions.2 34 The extent of the direct consumer
SEC

Open

Meeting

(July

22,

2009),

transcript

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO72209mls.htm.
30 See Press Release, CERES, Investors Achieve Major Company
Commitments on Climate Change: First-Ever Majority Vote, Tougher
Mountaintop Removal Scrutiny, Cancelled Coal Plants Among Highlights (Aug.
24, 2009), available at http://www.ceres.org/Page.aspx?pid=1 121 ("A record 68
climate-related shareholder resolutions were filed by investors [in 2009], of
which 31 were withdrawn after the companies agreed to positive climate-related
commitments.").
231 See Neil A. Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton & Robert A. Kagan,
Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection,

27 LAW & POL'Y 289, 300-07 (2005) (giving example of actions taken by firms
in the chemical industry to preserve their goodwill).
232 See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30
L. & SOC'Y REv. 549, 575-76 (1996) (reporting results of a study of firm

managers and concluding that when moral beliefs are strong, other factors were
"virtually superfluous"); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable
Typology of Social Norms in CorporateEnvironmental Compliance, 22 STAN.

ENVTL. L.J. 55, 76-78, 81-117 (2003) (discussing empirical literature on
influence of environmental norms on environmental decision-making).
233 See Cohen, supra note 226, at 10,250 (noting research on social influences
on firm behavior).
234 See

BUSINESS

CARBON

TRUST,

OPPORTUNITY

PRODUCT

2

CARBON

(2008),

FOOTPRINTING:

THE NEW

http://www.carbontrust.

co.uk/publications/pages/home.aspx (search "carbon label;" then follow "Product
Carbon Footprinting: The New Business Opportunity Pack CTC744" hyperlink).

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 275 2010-2011

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL.

276

[Volume 18

influence is unclear, but firms appear to respond in a much more
complex way than simply by reacting to immediate changes in
Actual shifts in consumer
consumer purchasing behavior.
purchasing appear to be only a part of the influence on firm
behavior. Many firms are risk-averse and appear to act to protect
legitimacy, reputation, and brands even when changes in consumer
behavior are uncertain. 235 For this reason, disclosure requirements
may affect actual emissions even if they do not have prompt
effects on consumer purchasing behavior. NGOs take advantage
of this phenomenon by targeting firms regarding their purchasing
policies directly rather than focusing on promoting consumer
activism.23 6 Thus, the effectiveness of a consumer labeling
strategy may turn more on the potential for long-term consumer
and stakeholder responses than on immediate changes in consumer
purchasing behavior, an important point because the literature on
green consumer behavior is mixed.
On the one hand, U.S. consumers have demonstrated only

235 See Auld et al., supra note 21, at 425-26. Recent studies on the effect of
New York restaurant disclosure standards on consumer food purchases and diet
have been mixed. Compare Julie S. Downs et al., Eating by the Numbers, N.Y.

TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at A31 (concluding that few changes occurred in
consumer food purchasing decisions), with Julie S. Downs et al., The Psychology
ofFood Consumption: Strategiesfor PromotingHealthierFood Choices, 99 AM.

ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC., 159, 159-60 (2009) (stating that studies show that
food labeling alone does little to improve diet); compare also Brian Ebel et al.,
CalorieLabeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income
People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. wl110, wl114-17 (Oct. 6, 2009)

(discussing studies of food labeling in New York City and Newark indicating no
impact on calorie consumption), with David Morgan, New York Study Says Menu
Labeling

Affects

Behavior,

REUTERS,

Oct.

26,

2009,

http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE59P40720091026 (reporting on
results of study finding changes in consumer food purchasing decisions). The
most important effects may be on the long-term decision-making by restaurant
managers about the caloric content of the foods sold at the affected restaurants,
however.
236 For a discussion of the importance of corporate customers on firm
environmental policies, see Auld et al., supra note 21, at 425. A possible
example of the outcome of this strategy is that NGOs obtained commitments
from many major grocers (Albertsons, Food Lion, Kmart, Safeway, and WalMart) and restaurants (Long John Silvers, Red Lobster, Subway, Olive Garden,
Carl's Junior, and Walt Disney) to sell only dolphin-safe tuna despite the absence
of specific consumer boycotts or other activities in many cases. See Defenders
http://www.defenders.org/
Dolphin-Safe
Retailers,
of
Wildlife,
programs-anLpolicy/habitat-conservation/marine/dolphin-safetuna/take
action/dolphin-safejretailers.php (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
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limited willingness to pay more for green goods, 237 often opting for
goods with green characteristics only if the price and other key
features are very similar or the price premium is small. 238 in
addition, the profusion of labels has generated "label confusion"
and "label fatigue." 239 On the other hand, as the remarkable
growth of organic and fair trade foods demonstrates, a large and
growing segment of the retail market appears to be willing to pay a
premium for environmentally preferable goods. 2 4 0 Studies also
have found that Europeans are willing to pay somewhat more than
Americans for goods with ecolabels.24 1 In addition, many
237

Wesley Nimon & John Beghin, Are Eco-Labels Valuable? Evidence
from

the Apparel Industry 17 (Iowa State Univ. Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev. Working
Paper 99-WP 213, 1998) (finding that consumers would pay a premium for
clothing with organic fiber label, but not for labels indicating "no-dye").
238 See, e.g., Roy C. Andersen & Eric N. Hansen, Determining Consumer
Preferences for Ecolabeled Forest Products: An Experimental Approach, J.

June 2004, at 28, 29-30 (concluding that when priced at a 2 percent
premium, wood products with eco-labels do not outsell others); Roy C. Anderson
FORESTRY,

& Eric N. Hansen, The Impact ofEnvironmental Certification on Preferencesfor
Wood Furniture:A Conjoint Analysis Approach, 54 FOREST PROD. J., Mar. 2004,

at 42, 48 (demonstrating that compared to price, wood origin is relatively
unimportant to consumers of wood furniture); Paul C. Stem, Information,
Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL'Y

461, 467-68 (1999) (noting limited consumer response to many green appeals).
239 See, e.g., Jill J. McCluskey & Maria L. Loureiro, Consumer Preferences
and Willingness to Payfor Food Labeling: A Discussion ofEmpiricalStudies, 34
J. FOOD DISTRIBUTION RESEARCH 95, 96 (2003); Morten Scholer, Senior Market
Dev. Adviser, Int'l Trade Centre, Presentation at 13th Int'l Fed. of Organic
Agric. Movements Scientific Conference, Basel, Switzerland (August 2000),
summary available at http://www.intracen.org/mds/coffeecertification.htm
("Coffees can be labeled (1) organic, (2) Fair Trade and (3) Bird Friendly. This
has created a certain label confusion and label fatigue among consumers.").
240 See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Blend & Eileen 0. van Ravenswaay, Measuring
Consumer Demandfor Ecolabeled Apples, 81 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1072, 1076
(1999) (concluding that over 40 percent of households would be willing to pay a
$0.40 price premium for ecolabeled apples); Brian Roe et al., US Consumers'
Willingness to Pay for Green Electricity, 29 ENERGY POL'Y 917, 924 (2001)
(concluding that "a wide array of population segments are willing to pay small
amounts for tangible improvements in air emissions" and that "for certain
population segments only, larger premiums may be obtained. . ."); see also
Andrew Downie, Fair Trade In Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at Cl (noting
that demand for fair trade coffee has grown among consumers and is sold at
Sam's Club, Dunkin Donuts and other non-specialty stores); Amanda Little,
Don't Discount Him: An Interview with Wal-Mart CEO H. Lee Scott,
GRIST.COM,
Apr.
12,
2006,
http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/

2006/04/12/griscom-little/index.html (noting Wal-Mart's growing selection of
organic products).
241 See, e.g., Thomas Bue Bjorner et al., Environmental Labeling and
Consumers' Choice-An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Effect of the Nordic Swan, 47
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consumers do not appear to view some purchases as a matter of the
comparative cost of the good. Instead, in some cases, they view
firms and products in a moral light, and if a firm or product is
viewed as "bad," many customers will shun them with little regard
to cost. 2 4 2 NGOs have relied on customers' prescriptive norms and
tendency to categorize firms and products in absolute terms in
organizing successful boycotts and information campaigns directed
at the reputation of a firm or industry sector.243
In addition, consumer concerns about environmental harms
appear to have very strong effects on product choices when an
environmental issue becomes particularly salient and is linked in
the media to consumer behavior, as climate change may become at
some point in the future. For example, concern about dolphin
deaths devastated consumer markets in the U.S. for canned tuna in
the late 1980s, until the "dolphin-safe tuna" label helped revive the
canned tuna market in the 1990s. 2 44 The consumer response also
may have contributed to supply chain pressures that resulted in
improvements in tuna fishing practices: annual premature dolphin
deaths dropped from over 100,000 in the 1980s to under 5,000 in

J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 411, 428 (2004) (finding a 13 to 18 percent range in
consumers' marginal willingness to pay for eco-labeled toilet paper).
242 See, e.g., N. CRAIG SMITH, MORALITY AND THE MARKET: CONSUMER
PRESSURE FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 200-325 (1990) (discussing
consumer responses to NGO boycott campaigns); Ruth V. Aguilera et al.,
Putting the S Back in CorporateSocial Responsibility: A Multi-Level Theory of
Social Change in Organizations 40 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Business, Working

Paper No. 04-0107, July 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=567842
("[T]he moral concerns of consumers are most relevant in determining the
amount of pressure they will place on firms to engage in [corporate social
responsibility]."); Jill Gabrielle Klein et al., Why We Boycott: Consumer
Motivations for Boycott Participation and Marketer Responses 4 (Ctr. for
Marketing, Working Paper No. 03-702, June 2003), available at
http://facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/03-702.pdf
(concluding that "boycott
participation is generally prompted by the belief that a firm has carried out some
egregious act"); see also N. Craig Smith & Elizabeth Cooper-Martin, Ethics and
Target Marketing: The Role ofProductHarm and Consumer Vulnerability, 61 J.
MARKETING 1, 1 (1997), availableat http://www.jstor.org/stable/I251786.
243

See, e.g., Garrett,supra note 224, at 49 (noting the importance of policy

commitment and image pressure in addition to economic influences on firm
responses to boycotts); Robert Innes, A Theory of Consumer Boycotts Under
Symmetric Information and Imperfect Competition, 116 EcoN. J. 355, 361-62

(2006) (reviewing economics and literature on consumer boycotts).
244 See Mario F. Teis1 et al., Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidencefrom
Dolphin-Safe Labeling, 43 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 339, 355-57 (2002).
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1993.245 Similarly, although labels were not involved in the early
stages of the issue, consumer concern over the ozone hole led to
declines in consumer purchases of aerosol containers in the mid
and late 1970S.246 The consumer reaction was strong and, in the
absence of a label, even extended to aerosol containers that did not
actually contain ozone depleting chemicals.
Finally, high income consumers comprise much of the market
for green goods, but the market is not limited to high-end
consumers. Organic foods and fair trade coffee are examples of
ecolabeled products that have expanded from the luxury market to
discount stores. For example, fair trade coffee is now the house
brand at Sam's Club, is sold at Dunkin' Donuts, and is the only
coffee sold in McDonald's stores in New England.24 7
Supply Chain Contracting Pressure. As discussed above, if

supply chain emissions are included in corporate and product
reporting regimes, firms will have less incentive to outsource
production solely for the purpose of avoiding the emissions.
Instead, firm decisions will reflect the total carbon footprint of
their operations. Although only limited empirical research has
been conducted on the relationship between social license pressure
and supply chain contracting,2 48 studies in the environmental and
labor areas suggest that disclosure of corporate and product carbon
emissions could induce firms not only to change the practices of
their own facilities in developing countries, but also to impose
supply chain requirements on their domestic and foreign thirdparty suppliers. 24 9 Studies suggest that firms respond to private
2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA
COMMISSION (2006), available at http://iattc.org/PDFFiles2/IATTC-AnnualReport2004ENG.pdf.
245 See

246 See Douglas W. Cray, Aerosol Industry
Is Trying Hard To Find
FluorocarbonsSubstitute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1976, at 45.

247
248

Downie, supra note 240, at C5.
For recent literature reviews, see Vogel, supra note 21, at 264-75; Auld et

al., supra note 21, at 424.
249 See Tim Bartley, CorporateAccountability
and the Privatizationof

Labor
Standards: Struggles over Codes of Conduct in the Apparel Industry, 14 RES. IN

POL. Soc. 211, 219-25 (2005) (noting that pressure for better labor standards
extends to third party suppliers in the apparel industry); O'Rourke, supra note
223 (noting that shareholder activism affects labor standards imposed through
supply chain contracts); Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Investing Up: FDI
and the Cross-Country Diffusion of ISO 14001 Management Systems, 51 INT'L
STUD. Q. 723, 730 (2007).
See generally POSTIMPERIALISM AND WORLD
POLITICS (David G. Becker & Richard L. Sklar eds., 1999).
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standards by imposing environmental requirements on suppliers in
developing countries, and these requirements affect supplier
behavior. 250 For instance, empirical studies demonstrate that
developing country exporting firms that contract with developed
country importers participate more frequently than other
developing country firms in private governance schemes that
impose extra-legal requirements. 25 1 These developing country
firms also have better environmental compliance than peer firms
that are less involved in exporting to developed countries. 252
Recent activity by Wal-Mart provides a valuable example of
the potential extent of the supply chain contracting activity that
could be expanded to many sectors. Wal-Mart has responded to
social license and other pressures by adopting extensive
environmental requirements that apply to its domestic and foreign
suppliers. The firm recently announced that it is imposing energy
efficiency requirements (which will reduce carbon emissions) on
its Chinese suppliers under new corporate responsibility guidelines
that will be phased in from 2008 through 2010.253 The firm uses a
Sustainability Index as a tool for buyers to evaluate its 60,000
suppliers. The Sustainability Index requires suppliers to sign
documents of environmental law compliance, starting with
Chinese suppliers to the U.S., UK, and Canada in early 2009. The
top 200 suppliers also will be asked to demonstrate 20 percent
energy efficiency improvements, and by 2012, all direct Wal-Mart
suppliers will be required to source 95 percent of their products
from companies with the best audit ratings. All suppliers also will
need to reveal the name and location of all factories used for each
good produced.2 54 As discussed at the outset, the potential
influence on Chinese facilities is substantial: Wal-Mart has 10,000
direct Chinese suppliers, and 20 percent of Chinese firms are
250 See Vandenbergh, supra note 78, at 930-32 (providing examples of supply
chain contracting requirements imposed on foreign suppliers).
251 See Petra Christmann & Glen Taylor, Globalization and the Environment:
Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation in China, 32 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 439,

452-53 (2001).
252

253

Id.

See Bustillo, supra note 215, at 4 (discussing sustainability index

initiative). See generally Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Wal-Mart Hikes Standards
for Suppliers in China on Product Safety, Environment, BNA INT'L ENv'T
DAILY, Oct. 24, 2008.
254 WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

2009 GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY
(2009), available at http://walmartstores.com/Sustainability/.

REPORT
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somewhere in the Wal-Mart supply chain.
Deforestation in the tropics is a leading source of carbon
emissions, and the recent Wal-Mart supply-chain activity also has
the potential to reduce carbon emissions in this area. Beef
production is particularly important because tropical forests are
cleared to make way for cattle grazing and the clearing process
releases tremendous amounts of carbon, both directly as forests are
burned and indirectly from the release of carbon from tropical soils
and the loss of carbon uptake from the vegetation. 255 Direct public
restrictions on deforestation have been very difficult to develop
and implement, and measures to reduce deforestation were not
included in the Kyoto Protocol. 256 A Wal-Mart grocery subsidiary
is one of Brazil's largest grocers, however, and in 2009, after
Greenpeace released a report critical of the cattle sector, the WalMart subsidiary joined a boycott of beef suppliers linked to
tropical deforestation. Other participants included McDonald's,
Timberland, Adidas, and other firms with large consumer markets
in the U.S. and EU. The Brazilian government was not a signatory
to the agreement that was reached among the other international
firms, Greenpeace, and the beef suppliers.2 57 The effects remain to
be seen, but this step has the potential to reduce emissions from
Amazonian deforestation directly and to buttress other private and
public efforts at the domestic and global levels.
The Coasian literature of the last several decades has
highlighted the importance of clearly defined entitlements,
information, and monitoring and enforcement. Not surprisingly,
the social license pressure that has been brought to bear on firms
has been heavily influenced by organizations and activities that
focus on these areas. New non-state market-driven governance
systems have arisen that seek to shape environmental social
See William Boyd, InternationalForest Carbon and Climate Governance:
Current Status and Prospects, forthcoming in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE
255

CHANGE: REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST
DEGRADATION 1 (Valentina Bosetti et al., eds. 2010) (manuscript on file with the

authors) (concluding that there is "mounting evidence that we cannot stabilize
atmospheric CO 2 at a safe level without addressing emissions from the forest
sector").
256

See id.

Kepp, supra note 24, at 1; Barrioneuvo, supra note 25, at A7; see also
SLAUGHTERING THE AMAZON (2009), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemational/press/reports/slaughtering-the-amazon
(calling attention to the cattle-related issues).
257

GREENPEACE INT'L,

Imaged withHeinOnline
Permission
NYU
Law Journal
-- 18from
N.Y.U.
Envtl.Environmental
L.J. 281 2010-2011

282

N.Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Volume 18

licenses and to reduce the costs and provide the information
necessary to improve the effectiveness of supply-chain monitoring
and enforcement. 258 These organizations range from purely private
NGOs, to NGO-corporate hybrids, to NGO-corporate-government
hybrids. Examples include the Forest Sustainability Council for
forestry practices and the Marine Stewardship Council for
sustainable fisheries. They often set standards for sustainable
conduct, certify compliance, and allow the use of labels for
certified products. Monitoring and enforcement of private supplychain contracting requirements can be costly and has been
questionable in some cases,2 59 but numerous NGOs pressure firms
to adopt supply chain requirements and police their suppliers'
compliance.
Compliance with the new private standards has
contributed to the creation of a new market for private assurance
services, 26 1 and in response to recent criticisms, some firms have
announced that they will increase unannounced, third-party audits
as a way to enforce environmental requirements.26 2
Numerous questions exist about the origins, function, and
relative merits of these new actors in the global environmental,
labor, and health areas.26 3 Although these developments have been
the subject of active research in recent years, policymakers and
NGOs have yet to appreciate fully their potential role in global
climate change governance.
Major Developing Country Incentives. Pressure on the supply,

chain may reduce the direct carbon emissions from the major
developing countries and may create incentives to shift policies
regarding carbon emissions in a variety of ways. If firms in a
developing country face pressure for carbon emissions reductions
from the firms to which they sell, the developing country firms
258 See Vogel, supra note 21, at 270 (noting the increase in non-state, marketdriven governance systems).
259

See generally Vandenbergh,supra note 78.

260 See Vogel, supra note 21, at 266 (noting that some NGOs have shifted the
target of their advocacy from states to private firms).
261 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in

Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 328 (2008) (examining the growth of
private firms that verify corporate compliance with public and private standards
for environmental and other performance).
262 See, e.g., Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Announces Sustainable
Product

Index

(July

16,

2009),

available

at

http://walmartstores.

com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/9277.aspx.
263 See generally Vandenbergh,supra note 78.
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may seek ways to reduce emissions. In some cases, the supplier in
the developing country will take direct actions to increase
efficiency and reduce the carbon emissions from their facilities
(particularly if the importing firms provide organizational,
financial, and technological assistance). If a supplying firm
identifies efficiencies, its costs of complying with carbon limits
will decline, and it will have less reason to advocate for resistance
to national carbon targets. In other cases, the supplier will have
incentives to find emissions reductions in its supply chain. For
example, it will have incentives to pressure the private or public
electricity and other energy suppliers to provide less carbonintensive energy.
The supplying firm and its suppliers also will have incentives
to advocate for changes in government investments and policies
within the developing country to help them reduce the carbon
emissions associated with their products. In particular, firms will
have incentives to advocate for domestic policies and investments
that promote low-carbon energy generation systems and a lowcarbon transportation infrastructure.
The focus on carbon
emissions reductions by exporting firms also may spill over to
other firms in the developing country as best practices spread
through industry sectors. 2 64
Although the possible reasons for corporate pressures for
carbon regulation vary from raising rivals' costs, leveling the
playing field, reducing uncertainty, assuring the long-term supply
of materials, or simply reducing stakeholder pressure, it is clear
264 See RONIE GARCIA-JOHNSON, EXPORTING ENVIRONMENTALISM:
U.S.
MULTINATIONAL CHEMICAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO 2 (2000)

(noting spillover effects in environmental practices); Brian Greenhill et al.,
Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, -1986-2002, 103 AM.
POL. SCI. REv. 669, 678 (noting spillover effects in the labor rights area). Supply

chain contracting may be one of the mechanisms by which the "California
effect" occurs. See generally DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995) (noting that trade
can induce more stringent regulatory standards in exporting countries). As
Daniel Abebe and Jonathan S. Masur have argued, however, the difficulties of
inducing China to join an international climate change agreement are closely
linked to domestic political dynamics and should not be underestimated. See
Daniel Abebe & Jonathan S. Masur, International Agreements, Internal
Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The "Two Chinas" Problem, 50 VA. J.

INT'L L. 325, 326-28 (2010). We do not suggest that our approach alone will
create the necessary incentives, only that it is an important and viable additional
means of creating incentives to participate in an international agreement and to
reduce emissions even in the absence of an agreement.
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that companies themselves can become an important source of
pressure for government regulation. Consider a company based in
a developing country that sells its products in the home country as
well as exports them to a developed country with emission caps.
The company might be able to split its production between
domestic and foreign production and hence avoid carbon
reductions in the domestic component of its production, but a more
likely scenario is that factories will produce for multiple markets,
including the home market. Thus, if the company reduces carbon
emissions and raises its cost of production, this will also affect its
cost of producing domestically, which will put it at a competitive
disadvantage to other domestic companies that do not export their
products. It might be in the firm's interest to lobby for domestic
carbon regulation to level the playing field. At the same time,
there may be less political opposition to regulation to the extent
"new jobs" are no longer being created by developed country
offshoring. Overall, our carbon disclosure strategy would appear
to provide both positive political pressures for regulation in
developing countries and a loosening of political opposition to
regulation in these countries.
C.

Economic Effectiveness

In the final analysis, the costs of our carbon disclosure
strategy (including the transaction costs of generating and
disclosing carbon information and the costs arising from the
consumer, firm and other responses to this information) should be
weighed against the costs of not inducing the major developing
countries to reduce emissions, and of reducing those emissions
through the other viable strategies. A full analysis of these issues
is beyond the scope of this article, but we do examine several types
of costs likely to arise from our disclosure strategy and efforts that
could reduce them.
A leading concern about supply-chain emissions is that the
transaction costs of calculating the emissions from numerous small
suppliers could be substantial. For our proposal to succeed, lines
must be drawn around the required reporting to reduce incentives
for leakage without generating transaction costs that exceed the
benefits of the reduced leakage. If a perfect or near-perfect
accounting of all emissions from the supply chain is necessary, the
costs may exceed the benefits in many cases.
A rough
approximation may, however, eliminate most leakage incentives
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without triggering substantial transaction costs. The optimal
boundaries of a new carbon footprint that includes the supply chain
will need to be studied empirically, but we are optimistic that a
boundary can be drawn that will strike an appropriate balance
between discouraging leakage and incurring transaction costs.
One possible approach for lowering transaction costs is to
establish default carbon emission levels by type of facility
(perhaps varying by characteristics such as fuel sources, countrylevel regulatory regime, etc.) based on existing facility and newly
sampled estimates. Such estimates could be made either by
government regulatory agencies or by independent third party
verification agencies. These default emission factors would be
based on the most polluting technologies used by each type of
facility/fuel source/country. These carbon emissions would then
be included in any calculations of a customer's carbon footprint.
Firms (and their customers) would have an option to apply a lower
level of emissions, however, if they provide third-party verifiable
evidence that their facility's emissions were lower than the default
level.2 65 This provides an economic incentive to lower emissions
at an upstream facility, as the ultimate seller can presumably
command a higher price than competitors in its home country by
offering a reduction in the carbon footprint of its products. As
long as the benefits of reduced emissions exceed the firm's costs
associated with verification, the facility would have an incentive to
reduce emissions. Thus, emission reductions are likely to take
place in facilities that have the least cost control technologies
available to them. Further, firms with high control costs are not
burdened by excessive verification costs, assuming they can still
compete and stay in business.
In addition, many of the data requirements and calculations
will be comparable for corporate carbon footprints and carbon
product labels, and cost savings may arise if reporting
requirements and methodologies for the two are coordinated.
Many firms also use the same suppliers or types of suppliers and
cost savings can arise from data sharing among firms. To facilitate
data sharing, the Sustainability Consortium 266 recently launched an
265 Many third-party verification schemes have been adopted for certification
and labeling programs in similar contexts. See, e.g., Forest Stewardship Council,
What is Certification?, http://www.fscus.org/faqs/what-iscertification.php (last
visited Apr. 29, 2010).
266 The Sustainability Consortium is a collaborative research effort with
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open-source database on corporate carbon supply chain emissions,
and it is encouraging companies to use the data in their carbon
calculations and to contribute new data. The development of more
accurate supply chain data also will reduce the cost of developing
a border adjustment scheme in the future. In fact, a well-designed
carbon labeling scheme might reduce the need for a border
adjustment program or at least enable policymakers to limit and
better target border adjustments to the areas that yield the greatest
leakage.
One source of cost savings is from the efficiency that will
arise as firms focus intensively on reducing the carbon emissions
of their supply chains. A large share of all carbon emissions arise
from energy use, but the low cost of fossil fuels over the last
several decades in many cases has not forced firm managers to
focus on energy when looking for efficiencies. Although raising
the price of fossil fuels would create renewed incentives to reduce
energy use, the political will to increase prices significantly may
be decades away. In the interim, pressure throughout the supply
chain could stimulate increased efficiency. Firms that have
developed sophisticated practices or technologies may have
incentives to share them with their suppliers. Examining the
supply chain for carbon emissions can yield overlooked
information about ways to generate net cost savings or to reduce
carbon emissions at low cost.
The extent of the cost-saving opportunity is hard to assess, but
recent case studies by the Carbon Trust in the United Kingdom
have identified large, previously overlooked efficiencies when
firms focused on reducing carbon emissions in the supply chain.
For example, a leading potato chip maker discovered that by
paying farmers by the pound for potatoes, it was inducing farmers
to pick wet potatoes, to ship the potatoes in this heavier condition,
and to humidify warehouses, only to remove the water in the chipmaking process.2 67 All of these steps increased energy use, costs,
and carbon emissions.26 8 Other studies have found similar results.
participants from the University of Arkansas, Duke, Harvard, Stanford, and other
universities. See Sustainability Consortium, Members, http://www.sustainability
consortium.org/members (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
267 See CARBON TRUST, CARBON FOOTPRINTS IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN: THE
13 fig. 8 (2006), available at
NEXT STEP FOR BusINEss 11,
htt ://www.carbontrust.co.uk/publications/publicationdetail?productid=ctc616.
268

Id.
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PepsiCo found that orange growing was a surprisingly large part of
the carbon footprint of its Tropicana emissions and is working to
reduce those emissions. 269 Timberland had a similar experience
regarding the share of its emissions attributable to the leather in its
shoes.27 0 Savings of these types cannot be expected to make
carbon foot-printing and labeling costless, but they may reduce the
net costs, reduce political resistance to adoption of a carbon
disclosure strategy, and make the disclosure strategy costcompetitive as compared to the other viable alternatives.
D.

DistributionalJustice

A full discussion of the distributional justice or equity issues
associated with our proposed carbon disclosure strategy is. beyond
the scope of this article. Nevertheless, to stimulate initial inquiry,
we assume that emissions mitigation is necessary at some level,
and we briefly examine whether our disclosure strategy differs in
its distributional justice implications from other viable approaches
(e.g., subsidies, moral suasion, and border adjustments).2 7 1 The
core climate justice problem is that economic activity is closely
associated with carbon emissions, creating a tension between
carbon emissions reductions and poverty alleviation.2 72 This
tension is particularly acute in the developing world, where
substantial percentages of the population are living in poverty. It
is tempting to argue that the poverty problem in developing
countries can be addressed simply by increased economic growth,
assuming that after exceeding some level of per capita income
countries will begin to reduce carbon emissions just as developed
countries have done with other pollutants. 273 To date this
269

Andrew Martin, How Green is My Orange?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at

Bl.
270 Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 940-41.

271 We do not address whether distributional justice concerns
dictate not
reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change if doing so will hamper poverty
alleviation efforts in the developing world. The response depends upon
projections about the effects of climate change on the poor, and views of
intergenerational equity, discount rates, the costs of emissions mitigation and
adaptation efforts, and other issues. See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note
5. We assume that the effects of catastrophic climate change will be sufficiently
severe and long-lasting that reducing the risk is in the interest of even those
countries with large populations in poverty.
272 Vandenbergh et al., supra note 2, at 307-08.
273 See John Tierney, Use Energy, Get Rich, and Save the Planet,
N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2009, at Dl; see also Gady Epstein, Climate: China Waits for the U.S.
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phenomenon has not occurred with regard to carbon in the
developed countries, however, and it would have to occur very
soon and begin at low per capita income levels in the major
developing countries to avoid exceeding atmospheric carbon
targets.27 4
Poverty alleviation, increases in well-being, and increases in
per capita income are not synonymous, however. 275 For instance,
China has had dramatic increases in per capita income over the last
decade, but the studies are mixed on whether individuals are more
satisfied with the way things are going in their life.2 76 Because of
the importance of perceptions of relative wealth and consumption,
to the extent our strategy creates incentives to reduce the most
extravagant consumption in the developed countries, it may
increase well-being in developing countries. 277
In addition, to the extent our carbon disclosure strategy
generates emissions reductions at lower cost than other strategies,
it will be more favorable for poverty alleviation. Our strategy also
may result in the transfer of substantial amounts of technology,
knowledge, and resources to firms in developing countries, as
developed world firms seek low-cost ways to reduce their carbon
footprints that now include offshore suppliers. If this transfer
enables developing countries to continue to be competitive in
to Act, FORBES.COM, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/17/chinaclimate-change-ge-beinecke-opinions-beijing-dispatch.html (noting opinion of
leading environmentalist that economic growth in China will lead to carbon
emissions reductions).
274 The U.S., Canada, and Australia are leading examples of countries with
high per capita incomes that have per capita carbon emissions that are over
twenty tons and rising. See Vandenbergh, supra note 22, at 919 (discussing
literature on the applicability of the Kuznets Curve to carbon emissions).
275 Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Consumption, Happiness,and
Climate Change, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,834, 10,835-37 (2008).
276 Compare John M. Gowdy, Behavioral Economics and Climate Change
Policy, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 632, 641 (2008) (noting survey results

showing reduced life satisfaction between mid-1990s and mid-2000s), with THE
PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, THE CHINESE CELEBRATE THEIR ROARING
ECONOMY, AS THEY STRUGGLE WITH ITS COSTS 1 (2008), available at

http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?Re[prtOD=261
(noting increases in
various measures of life satisfaction between 2002 and 2008).
277 See Cohen & Vandenbergh, supra note 275, at 10,836-37.
Some
strategies may be available that increase well-being without increasing the types
of economic activity that generates meaningful amounts of carbon emissions or
that reduce carbon emissions while generating major health co-benefits. See
Vandenbergh et al., supra note 2, at 329-30.
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export markets, but now with lower carbon intensity production, it
will enhance the prospects for poverty alleviation.
Further, as Posner and Sunstein have emphasized, there are
rich and poor individuals in developed and developing countries, 278
and the rich individuals typically emit far more than the poor even
when the rich live in developing countries. 279 To the extent rich
consumers in all countries will bear a greater burden of emissions
reductions under our carbon disclosure strategy, it may be more
equitable than other approaches. Our proposed carbon disclosure
strategy also could induce developed world consumers to increase
their willingness to pay for low-carbon -goods from developing
countries, which could result in comparative advantages for
poverty alleviation.
Developing
countries
blame
developed
countries'
consumption for causing emissions, yet they argue that they are
entitled to the benefits of further production to feed that
consumption in the future. Our approach re-frames the equity
issues from how the rich can help the poor avoid an unfdir share of
the costs of climate change mitigation, to what the obligations are
of consumers in developed countries to reduce the emissions
associated with their consumption.
Are developed world
consumers obligated to buy goods if purchasing the goods results
in poverty alleviation? Does or should the scope of the implicit
entitlement to consume include a carbon constraint? What if the
carbon emissions from the production of those goods will not only
contribute to poverty alleviation, but also to serious climate change
harms in developed and developing countries that occur in two or
ten generations and extend for multiple generations thereafter? If
our carbon disclosure strategy triggers a public debate on these
issues, it may stimulate consumer behavior changes and increase
pressure on firms to find ways to continue to buy goods from
countries with large populations in poverty, while also reducing
the carbon-intensity of these goods. By emphasizing the disparity
in per capita carbon emissions between the developed and
developing worlds, the reframed debate also may increase public
support for other types of emissions reductions in developed
countries.

278
279

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1568-70.
See Chakravarty et al., supra note 31.
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If preferences for carbon emissions reduction and poverty
alleviation among developed world consumers are sufficiently
strong, the disclosure strategy also could result in private wealth
transfers from developed country consumers to low-carbon
suppliers in developing countries. The booming fair trade coffee
market provides some sense of the opportunity. 280 How would
these wealth transfers compare to direct government-togovernment subsidies, whether for climate-related activities,
disease reduction, or other activities? 28 1 At this point there is no
way to know, but anemic levels of foreign aid for poverty
alleviation currently flow from developed to developing
countries. 282 Willingness to act in the private sphere, where
consumers control the effects of their choices, may exceed
willingness to lobby governments to act through subsidies. It is
possible that more resources will flow to developing countries
through the transfer of wealth that occurs when social license
pressures induce firm supply chain contracting actions than
through government-to-government aid programs.
CONCLUSION

The time is ripe to add an information-driven approach to
existing efforts before the public and private regulatory regimes
lock in on a leaky system that fails to create the necessary new
incentives for the major developing countries. Opportunities exist
at the global, federal, state, and local levels and in the private
sphere. At the global level, negotiations for a post-Kyoto cap-andThe divide between
trade regime are proceeding slowly.
developed and developing countries is at the root of the problem.
Developed countries are wary of adopting stringent emissions
reductions standards that will be ineffective in reducing the risk of
catastrophic climate change if developing countries fail to
participate. Developing countries need incentives to reduce
emissions, yet allocations of excess allowances, technology
subsidies, and other measures proposed to date have been
insufficient.
280 For example, how does the subsidy implicit in fair trade
coffee compare to
the relevant direct foreign aid on a country-specific basis?
281 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1590 (suggesting direct subsidies
unrelated to climate change).
282 See Sunstein, supra note 3.
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At the federal level, cap-and-trade legislation is likely to
become law at some point, but it is becoming more likely that
delay by the U.S. will provide further reasons for delay by the
major developing countries. The U.S. can design a. program that
will address the boundary problem, but the proposed legislation
and regulations thus far have not done so. Similarly, several
regional cap-and-trade schemes are still in their formative stages,
but all appear to be taking a narrow approach. Although the
federal and regional approaches appear to be heading down the
same narrow boundary path, the opportunity exists to re-examine
the issue before federal and regional programs are finalized.
Private reporting schemes that create incentives for firms to
reduce or shift emissions also are ripe for change. The bulk of the
initial efforts to date have been focused on inducing firms to
engage in voluntary reporting using a narrow definition that
excludes suppliers. In the last few years, private organizations that
develop and enforce these reporting schemes have begun to
explore the costs and benefits of a boundary that incorporates the
supply chain and have demonstrated the feasibility of doing so.
We argue for a boundary that captures the majority of
emissions from the supply chain. Further research will be needed
to assess the costs of implementation and anticipated emission
reductions, but given the existing understanding of the importance
of supply chains, offshoring, and the reluctance of developing
nations to regulate carbon emissions, our proposal could yield
remarkable net benefits. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a
successful global policy architecture over the long term that does
not include supply chain and product carbon disclosure.
Remedying the boundaries and leakage problem also may lead to a
more fundamental shift in regulatory thinking in the long run: a
move away from the exclusive focus on the emissions from the
locus of production to an additional focus on the emissions
associated with the consumption of goods.
The effort to address boundaries and leakage in climate
change governance is also an opportunity to take a fresh look at the
implications of bargaining in the shadow of the law for global
climate change policy. Bargaining occurs not only over legallyconstructed
entitlements,
but
also
socially-constructed
entitlements, and it occurs not only at the local level, but also at
the global level. Clear entitlements, adequate information, and
opportunities for monitoring and enforcement are important
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components of governance options that rely on private bargaining,
and our disclosure strategy addresses each of them.
Today, the principal focus of academics, policymakers, and
NGOs is on how nation-states can enter into a successful post28
Kyoto agreement.283 It is not surprising that the almost exclusive
focus would be on nation-to-nation bargaining and public
governance options. Successful international negotiations could
yield prompt emissions reductions, and for NGOs, applying direct
pressure on governments is well within their comfort zone. Yet
our analysis suggests that the price of creating sufficient incentives
for the major developing countries may be so high that additional
bargaining at the international level alone may not yield a viable
agreement in the short amount of time available. Traditional
advocacy efforts that pressure governments to regulate carbon
emissions are necessary but not sufficient given the limited public
appetite for serious emissions reductions in the developed world or
for large wealth transfers to the major developing countries.
Carbon information disclosure is a viable approach that can be
adopted by private and public actors now, even in the absence of
widespread public support for costly government action. We have
little time to waste.

283 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 273 (noting environmentalist's
statement that
"we're putting as much emphasis and as much pressure as we possibly can on the
US Senate to get action [on a domestic cap and trade bill]").
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